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ABSTRACT 
THE SPANISH FALANGE IN MEXICO 
DURING THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
Steven M. Higley, B.A., History, Fayetteville State University 
B.A., Spanish, Fayetteville State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: Jeffery L. Bortz 
The activities of the Spanish Falange in Mexico have escaped close scrutiny by the 
scholarly community. Likewise, scholars are only beginning to study the governmental 
organization that was tasked with monitoring the Spanish Falange in Mexico, the Direcci6n 
General de Investigaciones Politicas y Sociales (General Directorate for Political and Social 
Investigations), or IPS. This thesis uses the files ofiPS, collected in the course of its 
investigation, to ascertain basic facts about the Spanish Falange, restricted to the period 
during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). The significant leadership of the Falange in 
Mexico has been identified, ,as have its activities. Additionally, close study has been made of 
the advertising within the propaganda organs of the Falange in order to better ascertain the 
source of its economic and political support. The leadership was centered in the Spanish 
colony of Mexico City, with a significant cell at work in Tampico. It also appears plausible 
that there were additional cells operating elsewhere in Mexico. The primary work of the 
Spanish colony was the raising of financial assistance for General Francisco Franco and 
iv 
Nationalist Spain. The Spanish colony was also in active coordination with the consulates 
and embassies of Portugal, Italy, and Germany, for the purpose of fixing passports and 
possibly other activities. By this research, it has also become apparent that members of the 
Spanish Colony who were active in the Falange, and other Nationalist Spanish organizations, 
were almost universally from the north coast of Spain, had longstanding ties to Mexico by 
the time of Franco's rising, and in some cases held high-level positions in the financial 
establishment of Mexico. Given that, more research needs to be done to quantify the 
assistance given Nationalist Spain. In the process, it seems likely that more may become 
known about the existence and importance oflatent Porfrrian interests in the post-
Revolutionary era. 
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Chapter 1 -Introduction 
Mexico, the second largest supplier of military aid to Republican Spain after the 
Soviet Union, tolerated a robust network ofFranquistas- supporters of Francisco Franco-
within its borders throughout the Spanish Civil War. This network, by providing material and 
moral support for the Nationalist cause, was working against the Mexican government's best 
efforts to support the legitimate Republican government in Spain. The government of 
President Lazaro Cardenas allowed this fascist network to function freely in Mexico. 
Although this thesis will focus on about a dozen of the more notable members of the Spanish 
colony in Mexico City, these merely represent the leadership. There were in fact scores of 
Spaniards working not only in the capital, but also in the ports of Tampico and Veracruz and 
probably in the cotton-growing region ofTorre6n, in support ofNationalist Spain. The 
overarching goal of this thesis is to examine the leadership of this network, define its 
characteristics and activities, and attempt to explain why it was allowed to persist. 
The foundation for such an investigation rests in the archival records of the Direcci6n 
General de Investigaciones Pollticas y Sociales (General Directorate for Political and Social 
Investigations) or IPS. This was the Mexican rough equivalent to the American FBI or the 
British MI-5. Public access to these records was not available until the presidency ofVicente 
Fox, which represented the end of seventy years of one-party rule in Mexico, in 2000. As a 
result, historians have yet to give many of these records a thorough analysis. Where this 
particular era and this particular set of people are concerned, Pablo Y ankelevich is the only 
I 
one to have put these records to use. The focus of his work centers on widespread anti-
Spanish prejudice in Mexican society vis-a-vis the expulsion policy followed by the 
government of Lazaro Cardenas. Specifically, Y ankelevich asks why there were not more 
expulsions as was provided under Article 33 of the Constitution.1 Aaron Navarro has also 
produced a recent study that is focused more on the development of IPS and what I would 
call the "political taming" of Mexico's post-Revolutionary military leadership. The bulk of 
this work centers around three Mexican presidential elections, in 1940, 1946, and 1952.2 The 
Falange is dealt with only tangentially. However, it is the next closest thing I have been able 
to find. As with an earlier work by Maria Emilia Paz Salinas,3 Navarro's treatment of the 
Falange and Spain in general is cursory and still reliant upon American intelligence reports 
by the FBI and the military. Earlier studies are similarly plagued by over-reliance on 
American sources. As will be discussed in the conclusion, by using American documents 
historians have allowed their conclusions to be colored by the American point of view at that 
time. In this respect, the significance of Spanish activities in Mexico is only taken into 
account insofar as it aided Germany and Japan, and much of the intelligence on which the 
historiography is based was generated after 1941. This study will attempt to address 
documentation of Spanish activity in Mexico during the Spanish Civil War, with the main 
focus being how the activity assisted Francisco Franco, not Germany and Japan. After all, 
there were many in 1938 who still thought that Hitler was a leader with whom one could 
1 Pablo Yankelevich, "Gachupines rigurosamente vigilados: La excepcionalidad del 
gobierno de Lazaro Cardenas en Ia polftica de expulsi6n de espafioles indeseables," Historias 
59 (sep. a! die. de 2004) 45-62. 
2 Aaron Navarro, Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-
1954 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 201 0). 
3 Maria Emilia Paz Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S, as 
Allies in World War II (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
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work. The big lie of Munich had not yet been revealed. In such manner, it is hoped that this 
thesis will contribute to a more realistic portrayal of the events from 1936 to 1939. There is 
plenty of other evidence from the period to be found within the IPS records with respect to 
Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and even Italy. I chose Spain because the Spanish Civil 
War was the most significant global event of the period prior to Munich, at least insofar as 
Latin America was affected.4 Secondly, Mexico's relationship with Spain is different than 
with those other nations that might better be called powers because Mexico and Spain shared 
a common language, religion, and to a large degree a common culture, particularly where the 
literate portion of the two populations was concerned. There was also the special nature of 
the Spanish Civil War, with the underlying phenomenon of the Popular Front on the left and 
the reactionary rise of the right. I view the Spanish Civil War as the first proxy war of the 
Cold War and I find it interesting that Mexico- post-Revolutiouary Mexico- would 
implicate itself in such a conflict. 5 
The first goal of this thesis will be to describe the leadership network. For the purpose 
of conveying the contents of the archival record, I have divided members of the pro-Franco 
faction of the Spanish colony in Mexico City into three categories: elites, operators, and 
polemicists. The first is an exclusive term, the second and third inclusive. The 'elites' 
occupied highly influential commercial positions and were tasked with providing money to 
4 Of course, in sheer numbers the Japanese invasion of China proper in 193 7 was also 
highly significant; in economic terms certainly more so. However, the focus of my course of 
study is Latin America. 
5 It is my view that the Cold War is not an American-Soviet conflict, but rather a 
right-left conflict that has as its starting date the October Revolution of 1917. The reactions 
of London, Washington, and Tokyo against the new Soviet government confirm this view. 
Again, China- this time the anti-bandit campaign against Mao and the CCP- could be 
pointed to as an alternative case. 
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the Franquista cause, either from their own purses or by raising additional sums. Some of 
these elites could also be termed 'operators' or 'polemicists' or both, as they were engaged in 
activities that went beyond fundraising. In this respect, the separate categorization of 
operators and polemicists are by default: I have found no evidence that the individuals in 
question are wealthy enough to be termed elites. These operators were engaged in much of 
the dirty work which either did not require the participation of the elites- such as passport-
fixing and coordination with the Nationalist regime in Burgos, among other pursuits- or 
were disdained by the elites due to obvious legal implications. The category of polemicist is 
similarly by default. However, in this case it is probable that a polemicist could only acquire 
the ability to engage in such time-consuming activity by having attained the financial means 
to do so. Such is the case with Francisco Cay6n y Cos. Although he wrote a great deal of the 
propaganda used by pro-Franco publications, he is categorized here not as polemicist but as 
an elite by virtue of clear evidence of his wealth. There are many such cases of 
diversification on the part of the network. Notwithstanding these cases, I have classified 
individuals as polemicists, as with the operators, because there is insufficient evidence to 
term them elites. Thus, the categorization adopted herein is much more a description of who 
the people were, or at least who they appeared to be, according to the IPS investigation. At 
the point of describing what they actually did, it will become necessary to adapt the construct 
and add the qualifiers. At the end of this chapter is a table of the major supporters of Franco 
in Mexico, which I hope will assist the reader in the substantial section of the thesis. Please 
note the preponderance of Spaniards from northern Spain, particularly from the Basque 
region and Asturias (Vizcaya and Santander). Also note that the vast majority of these 
individuals had been in Mexico long before Francisco Franco entered the scene. The archival 
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record is replete with the dates of birth of these individuals and their age is usually an 
indication of the level of status they had attained within the network. 
The second goal of the thesis is to use the list of names in the IPS archive to establish 
connections that go beyond the archival infonnation. I believe that this thesis has succeeded 
in making connections, particularly in the financial sector, which historians have thus far 
omitted. It would not have been possible to do so without performing a thorough analysis of 
the IPS record with respect to the Spanish network. The analysis contained herein includes 
noting what companies were advertising in Franco's propaganda organs that were being 
published in Mexico during the Spanish Civil War. In the course of seeking further 
background information on the individuals under investigation by IPS, I happened to pick up 
Nora Hamilton's study of Mexico's financial sector in the context of the Marxist theory of 
"state autonomy."6 I have discovered that the financial institutions studied by Hamilton had 
much in common with the Spanish network in Mexico working for Franco and advertising in 
his propaganda. As this is merely a masters' thesis, the full nature of these financial 
connections cannot possibly have been fleshed out. Nevertheless, what connections have 
been established have been included here in order to illustrate the level of financial means at 
the disposal of the Spanish network and, hopefully, to show that further work in this direction 
has the potential of bearing fruit. 
The third goal of this thesis is to examine the position ofthe Mexican government 
with respect to this Franquista network. The Mexican government under President Cardenas 
6 Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). 
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had a clear foreign policy throughout the Spanish Civil War. One year into the war, not only 
was Mexico a significant supplier of military assistance to Republican Spain but it was also 
an outspoken critic of fascist aggression in Ethiopia, China, and Spain. Cardenas and his 
Foreign Ministry saw the three conflicts as a set, proof of the expansionist intentions of what 
would, by 1939, emerge as the Axis powers. Cardenas saw the policy of nonintervention in 
Spain put forward by Britain and France as de facto assistance to Franco's Nationalist 
regime, hence assistance to Franco's major abettors, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. 
Narcisso Basso Is, Mexico's roving ambassador in Europe, had said just that at the League of 
Nations.7 Mexico's place within the new balance of power was explained by Ram6n Beteta, 
the Under-Secretary for Foreign Relations at the time: "Although far from being a great 
power, Mexico nevertheless tried to behave like one in her diplomatic life." Beteta argues 
that Mexico's foreign policy "can be properly understood only in the light of her domestic 
policy." This domestic policy "questioned the sacredness of a profit-making system based on 
an absolute right of private property, in her Agrarian Reform and in her Labor Laws.''8 Given 
such lofty goals, I will join Pablo Yankelevich to ask why such a foreign policy was not 
supported at home by actions against pro-Franco elements operating within Mexico. 
Although at first glance it is unclear as to why this network was allowed to exist, and 
even thrive, it is my contention that it was allowed to do so because the Falange and other 
Franquista elements had penetrated the heart of Mexico's financial institutions and exploited 
7 T.G. Powell, "Mexico," Mark Falcoff and Frederick Pike, eds., The Spanish Civil 
War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 
1982), 63-64. 
8 Ram6n Beteta, "Mexico's Foreign Relations," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 208 (Mar1940), 170-171. 
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deficient capitalization of reform programs implemented by Cardenas. Franquista activities 
went beyond mere propaganda to include more nefarious activities such as raising funds for 
Franco's Nationalist Army, maintaining communications networks with the Nazis (and 
probably the Japanese), and fixing passports through the Portuguese, German, and Italian 
legations, which allowed Franquista intelligence assets to move freely across the Atlantic and 
throughout Latin America. The Mexican government also possessed information, tenuous as 
it is, indicating that Falangista agents were working to sabotage Mexico's collective 
agricultural project in the Laguna cotton-growing region, known as ejidalizaci6n. It would 
have been quite logical for the Mexican government to require the Spanish colony to desist in 
these activities. Even a matter as innocuous as publishing propaganda was so directly in 
conflict with Mexico's stated foreign policy that it could have been taken as prima facie 
evidence of sedition. Because this did not happen, potential conflicts of interest such as those 
in the fmancial sector take on added significance. Mexico's expropriation of the oil industry 
in 1938 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 also compromised policies of the-Cardenas 
govermnent that had previously been quite clear. 
It would be a good idea to explain the conventions followed by the paper, some of 
which the reader has probably already noticed. Due to self-editing functions of the software, 
unable to recognize the anglicized word for obscure groups or organizations dealt with 
widely in this paper, it is far more convenient to use the Spanish word for them. Thus 
members ofthe Falange are Falangistas, supporters of Cardenas are Cardenistas, and 
supporters of Franco are Franquistas. In Spanish, the software recognizes these terms. I hope 
that the reader will not be put off by this practice. Insofar as the materials cited in this paper 
are concerned, where the original is in Spanish I have prepared the translation in all cases. 
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Also problematic is the potential for conflation of terminology when dealing with the 
Falange. There were two groups working in Mexico in support of Franco: the Uni6n 
Nacionalista Espafiola (Nationalist Spanish Union), or UNE, and the Falange. The term 
"Franquista" will be used as a catch-all phrase. It generally will be applied when it is 
necessary to refer to both groups in conjunction, although I will caution the reader that it may 
have an either/or connotation and it may simply mean persons sympathetic to Franco with no 
specific reference to either the UNE or the Falange. The reader will have to infer this from 
the context; otherwise the narrative would be too stilted and cumbersome. When the word 
"Falange" is used, the reader will interpret this at the exclusion of the UNE, and vice versa. 
Not all supporters of Franco were Falangistas. In broader terms, the word "fascist" is to be 
interpreted as being part of the global anti-communist movement of the extreme right led by 
Germany and Italy. 
On the Republican side of things, it should also be noted that where the Spanish 
Embassy is cited the embassy is always representative of the Spanish Republic, for that was 
the legal and official government of Spain during the time period covered by this thesis. 
Although it is common to refer to the Republican side as 'loyalist,' I have shunned the term. 
The reasons for this are many. Although their loyalty to the Spanish government can be 
called into question, Carlists were most certainly loyal to the Spanish Crown. In this and 
other respects, I consider the term 'loyalist' to cause more confusion than clarity. Republican 
and Nationalist are clear enough. 
Finally, a word about the primary sources: a good many of these are reports from 
agents in the field to the head of IPS, "el Jefe." Agents were numbered, therefore Agent 
Number Seven ofiPS was known as "PS-7." He or she (there were female agents) would 
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even sign these reports by that designation alone. It will be hard enough for the reader (as it 
was for the researcher) to follow the names of all the Franquistas running about; therefore, 
the "PS-x" designation will be maintained by the paper. As for the system employed by 
Mexico's national archive, el Archivo General de Ia Naci6n, records are generally stored 
topically, in boxes (cajas) and files (expedientes). The bulk of this thesis is based upon four 
expedientes, comprising about five hundred pages in all. Given the window that has been 
opened onto the Cardenas administration by my research with regard to potential conflicts of 
interest, there are tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of other pages that now stand to be 
reviewed, for this is the bulk of the work in which IPS agents were engaged. The vast 
m!\iority ofiPS expedientes deal with local political developments. Those used to prepare 
this thesis represent the exception to the rule. 
The reports filed by Mexican agents are extremely thin on analysis. The purpose of 
their investigations was to collect information and transmit it to higher authority. If these 
higher authorities did engage in any analysis, it never made its way to paper and into the 
record examined by this research. This leaves the researcher in a quandary. There is plenty of 
information. What does it mean? The evidence contained in IPS records is far more 
quantitative and circumstantial than qualitative and empirical. It creates more questions than 
it provides answers. Much of the IPS record is of a circumstantial nature due to the fact that 
often the investigation has its origins in a denunciation- denuncio in Spanish- submitted to 
the government. Both the Spanish (Republican) Embassy and Mexican citizens made such 
denuncios against the Spanish colony in Mexico City. The task ofiPS was to collect further 
information to test the validity of such accusations. However, lacking any analysis such 
9 
investigations naturally lack any appurtenant conclusion. A clear conclusion would have 
been expulsion of the person under investigation. This almost never happened. 
10 
TABLE 1 
Major Supporters of Francisco Franco in Mexico9 
Name Birth 
Entered Citizenship 
Remarks 
Mexico Status 
Elites 
Manuel ±1896 1926 n/a President ofUNE and Falange; 
Do sal died 27Febl938 
Escand6n 
Jose 1882 1930 Spain Former President ofUNE and 
Vega del Cueto Santander Falange 
Angel Urraza 1891 1910 Spain Owner, Euskadi Rubber; owned 
Vizcaya 15% stake in Banco de Londres 
Jaime Santander 1912& Naturalized Co-owner, La Carolina (textiles) 
Arechederra 1931 Sepl935 
Jose Maria Santander 1908 Naturalized Co-owner, La Carolina (textiles) 
Arechederra Sepl935 
Francisco 1877, 1920 Spain Engineer; Agent, Compafiia 
Cay6nyCos Santander Transatlantica Espafiola 
Operators 
Augusto n/a 1900 Naturalized Kept office in Banco del 
Ibaf'iez Serrano Decl935 Comercio; personal 
representative of Franco 
Gilberto 1880s 1908, Spain Owner, New York Garage 
Ruido Garcia Orense 1937 
Jose 1906 Born in Spain President of Falange, as of 
Celorio Ortega Toluca, OF Mexico Febl938 
Polemicists 
Antonio n/a 1937 Spain Journalist; former Embassy 
Gasc6n employee; wanted for treason 
Hermindez 
Braulio Suarez n/a n/a Spain Owner, Diario Espafiol; brother-
in-law of Cay6n v Cos 
Jesus ±1883 1927 & Spain Director, Diario Espafiol 
Diaz de la 1930 
Fuente from 
Santander 
9 Archivo General de Ia Naci6n, Direcci6n General de Investigaciones Polfticas y 
Sociales, Caja 321, Expedientes 64 & 65, passim. 
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Chapter 2- Membership ofUni6n Nacionalista Espanola and the Falange in Mexico 
A close examination of the records of the Direcci6n General de Investigaciones 
Polfticas y Sociales (IPS)- essentially Mexico's FBI- reveals the existence of a large, well 
funded, and predominantly Basque, Cantabrian, and Asturian Franquista network with deep 
and long-standing roots in Mexico. Through a variety of methods, they intended to support 
Francisco Franco and his Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War. Not only by its 
existence but more importantly by the fascist network's activities, of which the archival 
record shows the Mexican Government was fully aware, such examination of the record 
makes it apparent that the policies of Cardenas and the Foreign Ministry abroad did not 
match those of the Secretariat of Government (henceforward referred to as Gobernacion) at 
home. In Mexico, this intricate network of cabals sympathetic to, and concretely supportive 
of, Francisco Franco was tolerated in spite of clear legal provisions under Article 33 of the 
Constitution that would have legally supported Cardenas had he taken action to expel such 
individuals. 
The Franquista network investigated by IPS in Mexico was comprised of a nepotistic 
community of Spaniards, Mexicans, Spaniards naturalized as Mexicans, and in one case a 
Mexican naturalized as a Spaniard, all actively working in Mexico City to make Franco's 
rising in Spain a success. They can be identified as an assortment of extremely wealthy 
industrialists and professionals, middle-level operators, and polemicists of all stripes. This 
network was engaged in collecting funds in support of Nationalist Spain; providing cover for 
12 
Franquista human intelligence assets by supplying illicit visas through the Portuguese and 
other legations; recruitment of new operatives; providing a communications network to the 
Nationalist intelligence network via a series of businesses that sometimes were merely fronts; 
and disseminating propaganda in support of the Nationalist cause in direct contravention of 
the official policy of the Mexican government. The IPS investigation was given impetus at 
two points in time: March 1938 and March 1939. Little evidence exists prior to the first date. 
Why the investigation was not pursued any further after March 1938 is not evident, nor is it 
clear why the investigation was briefly resumed in March 1939. It does not require a great 
deal of speculation to conclude that the March 1939 investigation was not continued due to 
Franco's victory and more pressing domestic concerns as the 1940 election approached. 
Of the elites, Angel Urraza, the Arechederra brothers, and Francisco Cay6n y Cos are 
by far the most important. Although Urraza was the owner ofHulero Euskadi, the dominant 
rubber company in Mexico, it was his other business activities that make him important to 
this thesis. The Arechederra brothers were owners of La Carolina textile mill. There is little 
direct evidence of their participation in Franquista plots, however this it likely due to the fact 
that they were naturalized Mexican citizens. Since it was not possible to expel them, there 
was no point in including them in an investigation of the Falange. Nevertheless, in the course 
of such investigations the Arechederras were connected to Francisco Cay6n y Cos. He was a 
mining engineer who, by the latter half of the 1930s, was also working as an agent for the 
shipping line Compafifa Transatlantica Espaflola. Due to the preponderance of evidence, 
Cay6n y Cos occupies a central place in this thesis. 
Among the operators, the most important are Augusto IbMiez Serrano and Jose 
Celorio Ortega. Ibaflez was publicly known as the personal representative of Franco in 
13 
Mexico. His influence upon Franquista activities can be seen in the correspondence of Cay6n 
y Cos. Celorio was head of the Falange from the time that IPS began its investigation in 
earnest, in March 1938. Of the polemicists, Antonio Gascon Hernandez is by far the most 
interesting as he abused his position in the Spanish Embassy to betray the Republic. 
However, the most important of the polemicists was Braulio Suarez, who was the brother-in-
law ofCayon y Cos, owing to his ownership of the pro-Franco daily Diario Espanol. 
Don Manuel Dosal Escandon, head of the Falange in Mexico, succumbed to illness 
and died in Mexico City on 27 February 1938. The funeral was held the following day at the 
Panteon Espafiol. IPS could not have contrived a better way to gather together such a wide 
array of Franco's supporters. Naturally, the (Republican) Spanish Embassy was more than 
willing to assist them in their investigation. Frankly, they need not have wasted their time. 
One of the Falange's main organs of communication, Diario Espanol, had as comprehensive 
a list of the attendees as IPS or the Spanish Embassy could want. 10 
Among the more than five hundred attending the funeral were Dosal Escandon's 
"political uncle," don Ismael Vega. He and Pedro Perez Fernandez presided over the funeral 
cortege. No doubt, it was through the marriage of Dosal Escandon to Ana Marla de Ia Vega, 
now his widow, that Vega became his political uncle. Although Ismael Vega was reported in 
attendance of regular meetings of the Spanish Nationalist Union (Union Nacionalista 
10 Transcription of Diario Espaflol, 5Mar1938, as found in Archivo General de Ia 
Nacion, Direccion General de Investigaciones Polfticas y Sociales, Caja 321, Expediente 64, 
24-25, henceforward given as AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,24-25. 
14 
Espafiola or UNE), 11 this Spanish citizen was later cleared by the head of the IPS of any 
involvement in the Falange with no explanation.12 Plenty of other members of the Vega clan 
were present at the funeral as well. There was Estanislao Vega, who held a seat on the board 
of directors of the Mutual Society of Travel Agents (Sociedad Mutualista de Agentes 
Viajeros or SMAV). The head of this SMA V, don Julio Vidal Comas, read a brief eulogy. 
Estanislau Vega and Fernando Dlaz de Ia Vega, also in attendance, were linked to the same 
UNE meetings as don Ismael. Gude Cardenas de Ia Vega, an "employee" of La Nueva 
Espana, 13 was there. Also listed in attendance were "the Vega brothers." Whether this was a 
redundant listing by Diario Espanol, or yet more members of !a familia Vega, is not clear. 
There were others bearing the Vega surname under IPS investigation. One of these was Jose 
Vega del Cueto, who entered Mexico in 1930 and was married to Julia Basterra, a Mexican. 14 
The Spanish Embassy had linked Vega del Cueto to fascist activities and financial 
contributions to Franco.15 IPS had come across Vega del Cueto before, as he was denounced 
in July 1936 by the Mexican organization FROC (Federaci6n Regional de Obreros y 
Campesinos del Distrito Federal) as an organizer of the Falange in Mexico, along with 
Baldomero Alvarez.16 Unfortunately, the IPS investigation of la familia Vega is not that 
11 "PS-7 a! Jefe de Ia Oficina de Informacion," Mexico, DF, 10Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 15. 
12 "Cipriano Arriola a! Jefe del Depto. de Gobiemo," Mexico, DF, 20Jun1939. AGN, 
DGIPS, 40:4, 58. 
13 No doubt La Nueva Espana was part of the Falangista propaganda effort; however, 
piuning down what it was and where it was published is problematic. There was such a 
publication by that name in Guayaquil, Ecuador and Porto Alegre, Brazil. See Allen Chase, 
Falange: The Axis Secret Army in the Americas (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1943), 26 & 
189. There were almost certainly others, though no such publication was investigated by IPS. 
14 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 108. 
IS AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,22 & 83-84. 
16 Y ankelevich, 53-54. 
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extensive and many of those in attendance at the funeral never came under close scrutiny in 
connection with the Franquista network. It is, however, worth noting that in September 1941 
the new head of the Falange in La Habana, Cuba, would be a man by the name of Francisco 
de Ia Vega. 17 Why a family this well connected to the head of the UNE and Falange was not 
investigated more fully is hard to say. 
What is more interesting, and more telling, is the list ofFalangistas and others who 
were not in attendance of the funeral. The bulk of the personages that follow were not in 
attendance. At his time, the Chamber of Deputies was carrying on a heated discussion of 
Spanish fascist activity in Mexico. There, on 9 March, Salvador Ochoa Renteria declared 
that, "We have concrete data on the reactionary work that is being developed at this moment 
in Mexico by many Spauish fascists, many gachupines who are developing a project not only 
against the government of Azafla, but also against the Mexican Government ... "18 Two days 
later, on 11 March, the Committee of Workers' Defense of the National Revolutionary Block 
of the Legislature delivered this concrete data to Gobernacion. 19 
Buried within this four page denuncio was the name of Angel Urraza, the owner of 
the rubber company Hnlero Euskadi. Urraza was born in Alons6tequi, Vizcaya, the Basque 
region of Spain, in 1891. By the time of Franco's 1936 rising in Spain, therefore, Urraza was 
of an age to be highly influential within the Spauish colony if he had the means, which he 
17 Chase, 72. Although not without its problems, this work, prepared by an 
investigative journalist based on smuggled Republican documents, is consistent with the IPS 
record in many matters of detail. 
18 Y ankelevich, 57. Gachupines is a pejorative term for Spauiards. 
19 "Comite de Defensa de los Trabajadores del Bloque Nacional Revolucionaria de Ia 
XXXVII Legislatura al C. Lie. Ignacio Garcia Tellez", Mexico, DF, 11Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 19-23. 
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obviously did have. He came to Mexico in 1910, during the last days ofthePorflriato.20 In 
1927, his immigration paperwork had been expedited via Bilbao, indicating continued ties to 
the Basque region. His 1932 Tarjeta Forma 14 (the Mexican version of a visa at this time) 
listed his residence as Club Espaila in Torreon.21 This will have significance later on. Euskadi 
(the Basque word for "Basque") had signed a subsidiary agreement with BF Goodrich in 
1930.22 Urraza was among the founding members of the investment group Sofimex, along 
with Maximino Michel, Enrique Sada Muguerza, Angel Muguerza, and Manuel Gomez 
Morin, although the most important of this group were the insurance magnates Federico 
Williams and Ignacio Hornik. Hornik, Swiss by nationality, was vice-president of General 
Insurance Company, Ltd. of Trieste and Venezia.23 Gomez Morin was the organizer of 
Accion Nacional, one of the many political action organizations founded around the world 
with a basis in Catholicism.24 He and Urraza were fellow stakeholders in the Mexican Bank 
of London (Banco de Londres), at five and fifteen per cent, respectively.25 
Another Basque name appearing on the Committee's denunciation is that of Jaime 
Arechederra, owner of the textile factory La Carolina according to this document. La 
Carolina was one of the four largest mills in Mexico, with over a thousand employees as 
20 The Porflriato was the long reign ofPorfirio Diaz. His abuse of power was one of 
the mani\' causes of the Mexican Revolution. 
1 Memorandum interna, "Angel Urraza Saracho," sin lugar o fecha. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:64, 131-132. 
22 Hamilton, 73-74. 
23 Ibid., 325-326. 
24 James D. Henderson, Conservative Thought in Twentieth Century Latin America: 
The Ideas of Laureano Gomez (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 
1988), 109. 
25 Hamilton, 319. 
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early as 1921.26 Arechederra, was "one of the most active animators of anti-Spanish [i.e., 
anti-Republican] propaganda ... An always eternal ~empiterno) corruptor of lower level 
employees at the Labor Department." His brother, Jose Marfa, was "cut from the same cloth 
(del mismo corte)." According to Diario Espai'iol, the Jose Marfa Arechederra was among 
those present at the funeral of Do sal Escand6n. 27 
As part of the business and merchant class, both brothers had a history of trans-
Atlantic travel, Jose Marfa having been detained at Veracruz in 1908, Jaime having visited 
Mexico in 1912. Jose Marfa carne to Mexico for good in 1927, Jaime in January 1931, 
perhaps as a result of the anti-monarchical revolution in Spain. Both were naturalized 
Mexican citizens on 3 September 1935.28 Both Arechederra brothers bore the maternal name 
Quintana. IPS had to be careful in their handling of the names of suspects. A simple 
misspelling could eliminate any possibility of making a connection that might be crucial to 
the investigation. There was a "Luciano Aredechederra" who also figured among the IPS list 
ofFalangistas in Mexico. A Mexican by naturalization/9 he was called out by the Spanish 
Embassy as an "agitator, Falangista, in direct relations with Mexican fascists," on 16 
March. 30 His name also appears as a handwritten entry at the bottom of an IPS inter-office 
26 Jeffrey Bortz, Revolution within the Revolution: Cotton Textile Workers and the 
Mexican Labor Regime, 1910-1923 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 30. 
27 Transcription of Diario Espailol, 5Mar1938, AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 24-25. 
28 "Informe de Gobernaci6n, Jaime Arechederra," Mexico, DF, 21Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 138 & "Informe de Gobernaci6n, Jose Maria Arechederra," Mexico, DF, 
21Mar1938, AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 161. 
29 "lnforme de Gobernaci6n, Para Antecedentes Migratorios," sin Iugar o fecha. 
AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 168. 
30 "Jose Loredo Aparicio, Encargado de Negocios, Embajada de Espafia, al Sr. Jefe de 
la Oficina de lnforrnaci6n Polftica y Social de la Secretaria de Gobernaci6n," Mexico, DF, 
l6Mar1938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 92. 
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list of Spanish fascists, this time as "Luciano Arechederra Quintana. "31 Whether Luciano 
was part of the same clan as Jose Marla and Jaime is not part of the record. 
The individual on whom there is the most information in the IPS records is Francisco 
Cay6n y Cos, who is privileged to have his own two-hundred and thirty-six page file on 
record, broken down into two volumes.32 The Spanish Embassy characterized him as a "con-
man and a pimp (estafador y souteneur)."33 According to his passport, he was born in 
Pesquera, Santander, in 1877.34 He was, in addition to the other occupations, a mining 
engineer working as an agent for the shipping line Compafifa Transatlantica Espanola (CTE). 
In 1926 CTE provided regular service between Bilbao, Santander, and Gij6n in Spain and La 
Habana and Veracruz in the Americas. 35 According to Allen Chase, the shipping line was a 
vital means oflanding Nazi spies in Florida.36 Cay6n y Cos was a columnist in Vida 
Espanola, a magazine published by the Spanish colony in Mexico City in support of 
Francisco Franco. Although Cay6n y Cos was neither owner nor director of this magazine, 
Cay6n y Cos was one of the magazine's biggest proponents. When it came time to apprise 
Franco of the publication's status, it was Cay6n y Cos who would write the Generalissimo.37 
31 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 103. 
32 AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Tomos I y II. The pages of this archival material are not 
numbered. 
33 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,22. 
34 AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
35 Frederick Pike, Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and 
Their Relations with Spanish America (Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 
1971), 226. 
36 Chase, 105-106. 
37 Sub voce, 42. 
19 
One ofCay6n y Cos's regular correspondents was Pio Noriega, a wealthy hacendado 
in Nuevo Le6n who was first cousin offfiigo Noriega.38 ifiigo Noriega was known to be a 
friend of Mexico's pre-Revolutionary dictator Porftrio Dfaz and a member of the board of 
Compafifa de Seguros La Fraternidad, an insurance company. According to Frederick Pike, 
ffiigo Noriega came to Mexico in 1900 as a pauper and built his fortune before the demise of 
the Dfaz regime.39 It was Florencia Noriega who was among the founding members of the 
mill La Carolina, 40 the mill now belonging to the Arechederra brothers, and Florencia 
Noriega too was a friend ofCay6n y Cos.41 How the mill came to the Arechederra brothers, 
the IPS records do not tell, but La Carolina continued to advertise under the name C. Noriega 
and Successors in Vida Espanola. 42 Cay6n y Cos and Arechederras were part of the same list 
of Spaniards investigated by PS-15. Cay6n y Cos could not be located; however, there is 
nothing unusual in this as his correspondence is replete with mentions of travel within 
Mexico.43 Given his mining concerns, his position within CTE, and his pro-Franco 
politicking, Cay6n y Cos was a very busy man. It appears from the banter in the 
correspondence between Cay6n y Cos and Pfo Noriega that they came to be associates 
through the former's work in the mining industry. 
38 Y ankelevich, 2004, 52. 
39 Pike, 240. This irugo Noriega should not be confused with irugo Noriega Lasso, 
listed in the study of Mexican banking by Ludlow and Marichal as a subscriber of shares in 
Banco Mercantil Mexicano in 1881. See Leonor Ludlow y Carlos Marichal, eds., Banca y 
poder en Mexico (1800-1925) (Mexico: Editorial Grijalbo, 1985), 342. Noriega Lasso died in 
1920. 
40 Bortz, 42. 
41 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos a Pfo Noriega," Mexico, DF, 24Dec1936. AGN, IPS, 
321:65, Torno I. 
42 "La Carolina, C. Noriega y Cia." [anuncio], en Vida Espanola. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:64, 36. 
43 "PS-15 al Jefe de Ia Oftcina de Inforrnaci6n," sin Iugar o fecha. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:64, 102. 
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Not all of the conspirators can be classified as wealthy elites. As with any 
organization, the mid-level operators were vital to day-to-day operations. Among these was 
Augusto lbafiez Serrano. Iflbafiez held any proprietary interests in Mexico, the IPS record 
does not say. Arriving in Mexico in 1900 and naturalized in 1935, he kept an office in the 
Banco de Comercio.44 On 10 March 1938, not long after the funeral, Mexican Foreign 
Secretary Eduardo Hay wrote to Ignacio Garcia Tellez at Gobernaci6n to inform him of the 
leadership among the Spanish right in Mexico, citing Ibafiez as the chief of the Falange. 45 
The following day, Ibafiez figured largely in the Workers' Committee denouncement, where 
they described him as "frankly undesirable," perhaps in an effort to help with the wording of 
the expulsion decree that they believed would be forthcoming. 46 
There was a tug-and-pull amongst the leadership of the clubby UNE and the hardcore 
Falange. In December of 1937, Jbafiez was of the opinion that the UNE lacked "spark" and 
Cay6n y Cos had convinced himself that it would be necessary to align with the Falange. 47 In 
his letters to Jose Burgos in Sevilla, Cay6n y Cos constantly complains about the UNE 
membership and their reluctance to supply funding freely. This represents a distinction 
between the UNE and the Falange. Although there are exceptions, the UNE's primary 
pursuits appear to have been propaganda and money-raising, whereas it was the Falange that 
engaged in activities that rose to the level of illegality in Mexico. In the same letter, Cay6n y 
44 "PS-5 al Jefe de Ia oficina de Informaci6n," Mexico, DF, 25Mar1938, AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 114, & "Memonmdum, Departamento de Gobernaci6n," sin fecha, AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 168. 
45 "Oral. Eduardo Hay a! C. Sec. de Gobernaci6n," Mexico, DF, 10Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 18. 
46 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 21. 
47 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos a Jose Castedo," Mexico, DF, 18Dec1937. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:65, Torno I. 
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Cos admits that for his part he "cannot see that the magazine can continue publishing, not 
only owing to the attitude of certain authorities, but on account of funding ... " and in the 
same breath he avers that the propaganda effort could be extended throughout Latin America, 
which "very much lacks useful propaganda in support of Spain and against all that signifies 
communism." 
Among the others, Jacinto Rodriguez was a stock-trader observed by IPS. He had 
entered Mexico in 1926 (from where in Spain it is not known) and was presently employed 
by Centro Mercantil. Since 1931, he had managed a $4000 account and retained $240 a 
month.48 In the midst of the Depression, these were not paltry sums and would certainly have 
been useful to Franquista fund-raising efforts. Rodriguez had attended Dosal' s funeral with 
the Gilberto Ruido Garcia family.49 Ruido Garcia was originally from the Galician district of 
Orense, entering Mexico in either 1906 or 1908.50 Here again, there appears to be some 
confusion in finite matters of detail in the IPS record, although in this case the confusion is 
on the part of the researcher rather than the agents collecting the information. This example 
highlights the problem of dealing with redacted documents (of which there are thankfully 
very few in the IPS archives.) According to one document, an internal IPS memorandum, it 
can be easily understood that Ruido Garcia was a medical surgeon, having attained the rank 
of lieutenant colonel ("[Redacted] Teniente Cor/. Medico Cirujano"), though it is not clear in 
what army.51 With the redaction removed, it becomes apparent that in reality he had been 
48 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 165. This was a worksheet for internal use by IPS. 
49 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,24-25. 
50 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 5 & 94. 
51 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 164. 
22 
recommended by a lieutenant colonel who was a medical surgeon. 52 In 1930, Ruido Garcia 
had traded accusations of robbery with Adolfo Yat'iez Zamora and in 1933 had made 
inquiries regarding naturalization. In the course of the March 1938 dragnet that followed 
Dosal's funeral Humberto Amaya, the head ofiPS, noted in an inquiry to the dactiloscopic 
department that Ruido Garcia had been implicated in the kidnapping of Spanish orphans in 
Morelia. 53 Of all the names appearing in the IPS rolls, Ruido Garcia stands out for his 
checkered past. Ruido Garcia was owner ofNew York Garage, a Mexico City gas station. In 
January 1938, the garage had burned down. 54 
Another active leader in the Falange was Jose Celorio Ortega, who is merely linked to 
that organization by Foreign Secretary Hay, but cited by the Spanish Embassy as the 
"Director of the Falange, in direct contact with Franco and the German Embassy," The 
Embassy noted specifically that Ce1orio's listed postal code corresponded with that of the 
Falange. 55 The son of Spaniards from the Asturian city of Oviedo, Celorio was born in 
Toluca, DF, in 1906.56 In spite ofthis, he claimed Spanish citizenship and had the Tatjeta 
Forma 14 required offoreign nationals in Mexico. Thus, the Mexican Government could 
have expelled Celorio had it wanted to. Celorio worked as the agent of a distribution 
company dealing in paper and graphic equipment, residing with his brother Constantino 
52 "PS-7 a! Jefe de Ia Oficina de lnformaci6n," Mexico, DF, 7Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64,5. 
53 "Humberto Amaya, Jefe de la Oficina de Informaci6n a! C. Jefe del Depto. 
Dactilosc6pico de Ia Jefatura de Polic!a," Mexico, DF, 16Mar1938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 
85. 
54 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,94. 
55 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 18 & 91-93, respectively. 
56 "PS-13 al Jefe de la Oficina de Informaci6n," Mexico, DF, 14Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 89-90. 
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where the two maintained a car, not exactly common for the time. The IPS does not appear to 
take much interest in "the personal representative of Generalissimo Franco." Here the trail 
ends in March 1938. It was not until the investigation was resurrected a year later by the new 
Gobernaci6n Secretary, Euquerio Guerrero, that further information on Celorio was 
collected. Inspector PS-17 was assigned to investigate both Celorio and Francisco Cay6n y 
Cos. 57 It was at this time that the two volumes of material seized from Cay6n y Cos were 
forwarded from Guerrero to the new head of IPS, Cipriano Arriola. 58 PS-17 promptly 
reported that Celorio was the "Regional Delegate of the Traditional Spanish Falange and 
JONS" (Junta of the National-Syndicalist Offensive) and as such is head of that organization. 
Those two organizations had merged in 1934.59 Celorio and the Falange had, PS-17 reported, 
accrued human, financial, and military assets "to add Mexico to the Spanish Revolution." 
They had also engaged in "illicit traffic in money and correspondence."60 Just as had 
happened a year earlier, at this point the investigation was dropped. 
Among the polemicists, Antonio Gasc6n Hernandez does not appear to have any link 
to those already described here; nor does he fit the pattern. He was college educated, having a 
degree from the University of Madrid, had been the director of the newspaper Iriformaciones, 
a correspondent in various other papers including La Prensa in New York, and was assigned 
as delegate of the Spanish (Republican) Government for negotiations with the Silk 
57 "Cipriano Arriola, Jefe de Ia Oficina, al C. Jefe del Departamento de Gobernaci6n," 
Mexico, DF, 14Mar1939. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 180. 
58 "Memorandum de Euquerio Guerrero, Jefe del Depto. de Gobierno," Mexico, DF, 
21Mar1939. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 178. 
59 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 114. 
60 "PS-17 a! Jefe de Ia Oficina de Informaci6n Politica y Social," Mexico, DF, 
20Mar1939. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 179. 
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Committee of the Industrial Ministry in Mexico.61 He entered Mexico with his wife and ten 
year old son via Laredo, Texas, on 18 April1937, a mere two months before Franco's rising. 
According to PS-7, Gascon was falsely linked to Indalecio Prieto by the Madrid paper 
Informaciones. 62 Here it becomes necessary to confront the internal politics of Spain. 
Indalecio Prieto and Largo Caballero had been at the head of the by-now venerable Union 
General de Trabajadores (UGT) in Spain that had broken with the Bolsheviks in 1920. In 
1934, the UGT held a dominant position in the Asturian mines and it was here that the UGT, 
by direction of Prieto and Caballero, collaborated for the first time with the CNT 
(Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo ). This collaboration took the form of fomenting an 
October revolution in order to (among other reasons) prevent "the lay Jesuit" Jose Maria Gil 
Robles from entering the govermnent. The revolt of the Asturian miners was among the most 
important events linking the end of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in 1931 to the beginning 
of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Once the civil war was underway communists had re-
penetrated the UGT and- again in league with the CNT- it was instrumental in a new 
collectivization of land in Republican held territory. 63 What PS-7 appears to be insinuating 
by saying that Gascon was falsely linked to Prieto is that Gascon had been able to establish 
Republican bona fides by linking himself to the labor leader. 
61 Informe intema, sin fecha, AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 164. Silk is sometimes used in 
muuitions such as powder bags in naval gunnery; therefore it may be regarded as war 
materiel. Furthermore, at this time the global supply of silk faced a significant disruption 
owing to the Japanese invasion of China proper. 
62 "PS-7 a! Jefe de Ia Oficina de Informacion Politica y Social," Mexico, OF, 
9Feb1938 [sic, 9Marl938]. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,2-3. 
63 Thomas, 39-41, 133, 138 & 293-294. 
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What is most unique about Gasc6n in relation to other Franquistas is that he came to 
Mexico at such a late date. If his connection to Prieto was not sufficient enough a credential, 
Gasc6n also came to Mexico recommended by Colonel Adalberto Tejeda,64 a faithful 
member of the Mexican foreign service who had done yeoman-like work procuring arms for 
Republican Spain while in Paris and would later be the key to the success of the Mexican 
program to grant refuge to Republican exiles after the Spanish Civil War and during the term 
of the Vichy Government. Many who did not escape Vichy died in concentration camps. 
Tejeda's recommendation would have been quite valuable, making Gasc6n's revolutionary 
(Mexican) bona fides at least as good as his Republican (Spanish) ones. On 5 March, PS-7 
reported, Gasc6n authored a piece in Universal attacking both the Spanish and Mexican 
governments. He had been known to have written under various pseudonyms such as 
"Capitan Veritas," "Licenciado Juan L6pez," and "Teniente Coronel Mariscal," but the 
Universal piece was under his real name. On 16 March he was included in the Spanish 
Charge's letter to the head ofiPS. 65 He had been expelled from the Embassy for treason and 
was considered a deserter for shirking his responsibility to return to Spain. Having 
established that Gasc6n was a collaborator with the fascist press, the Embassy also believed 
that he was working on a book against the Embassy and President Cardenas, exposing arms 
shipments from Mexico to Spain in the process. "He should not be in Mexico," the Embassy 
averred. PS-7 thought that Gasc6n had gone to Acapulco to start a magazine. 
64 "PS-7 a! Jefe de Ia Oficina de Informaci6n Polftica y Social," Mexico, DF, 
9Feb1938 [sic, 9Mar1938]. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,2-3. 
65 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,91-93. 
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Braulio Suarez was another polemicist, one whose social position fairly closes the 
circle of this analysis. Brother-in-law of Francisco Cay6n y Cos,66 Suarez was in both the 
Workers' Committee denunciation of 11 March and the Spanish Charge's letter of 16 March. 
The denunciation is far more colorful, describing Suarez as "illiterate, brash, shameless, with 
multiple precedents as a trickster and a con man ... Undesirable in equal parts for his 
subversive activities and his criminal conduct"67 The Embassy, on the other hand, 
emphasized his ownership of Diario Espafiol and his fascist activities. 68 IPS did little more 
than verify his immigration status as legal. 69 Although Suarez owned Diario Espafiol, IPS 
also investigated Jesus Diaz de Ia Fuente, who 1938 was regarded as the director of the 
daily.70 Diaz was known to have been a zacaton root salesman in 1930. He brought his 
servants with him to Mexico that year. In 1937, Diaz had paid the hefty sum of$1000 so that 
his servants might gain legal immigration status. 
These were not the only Franquistas working in Mexico at the time; they are merely 
the ones that I have selected by virtue of their apparent prominence. There was an equally 
extensive network in the oil refining port of Tampico. Reports indicate that the Tampico cell 
was more closely linked to the Germans, which stands to reason given that Tampico is a port 
city. For example, by its ad in Vida Espanola the Heynen-Eversbusch travel agency booked 
66 Unless Cay6n y Cos was a widower, this means that Suarez was married to his 
sister. Cay6n y Cos is listed as single by the IPS. 
67 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,21. In Spanish: "Analfabeto, audaz, desvergonzado, con 
multiples antecedentes de chantagista [sic] y estafador .. .Indeseable igualmente por sus 
actividades subversivos y su conducta delictuosa." 
68 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 91-93. 
69 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 168. 
70 Enrique Figueroa, "Jesus Dfaz de IaFuente," [memo], Mexico, DF, 25Marl938, 
AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 136-137 and "Cuarto Aniversario de Diario Espaftol," Diario 
Espafiol, 28Febl938, in AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 121. 
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departures from Tampico and Veracruz aboard the Nord Deutscher Lloyd lines, with service 
to Cuba and Spain, as well as Germany, France, and England.71 However, the leadership was 
in Mexico City and it was the leadership who controlled the purse-strings. The Spanish 
colony there, as has been shown, was comprised of wealthy elites. Some, such as Ismael 
Vega, ''political uncle" of the dead leader of the Falange, and Pedro Perez Fernandez, the 
other individual presiding over the funeral proceedings at the Panteon Espai'iol, were not part 
of the March 1938 investigation. Angel Urraza, head ofEuskadi Rubber, Jaime and Jose 
Marfa Arechederra, of La Carolina, and Francisco Cayon y Cos, of Compai'ifa Transatlantica 
Espanola underwent a cursory investigation in March of 1938. A year later, Cayon y Cos 
underwent more significant scrutiny, including having some of his personal papers 
confiscated- enough to comprise two volumes. 
Ibaftez Serrano was central to operations. He and Jacinto Rodriguez maintained 
offices in commercial houses. Rodriguez's companion at the funeral, Ruido Garcia, 
maintained a garage. Celorio adopted the modest residential cover of his brother's shoe shop, 
but his position as a distributor of paper and graphic arts supplies was of use in spreading 
propaganda. Gascon came from a publishing background in Spain and was now either a 
rogue freelancer in Mexico or an agent dispatched by Franco's SIM (Servicio de 
Investigacion Militar). The report by agent PS-7 makes no effort to determine this, but 
merely points out that Gascon is not who he claims to be. Braulio Suarez and his brother-in· 
law Cayon y Cos took advantage of their privileged positions to write much of the material 
put to use by Franco's propaganda organs. The operators and polemicists were a more visible 
71 [Aviso], AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,61. 
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aspect of Franco's efforts, though this will only become apparent when their activities are 
studied. 
29 
Chapter 3 - Franquista Activities in Mexico 
The network described in the previous chapter was dedicated, above all, to fund-
raising activities in support of Francisco Franco. Propaganda was a vital part of these efforts. 
The fund-raising aims of the propaganda were accomplished in two ways: first, by keeping 
members of the Spanish colony in Mexico City appraised of events in Spain and motivated to 
donate money; second, by publicizing successful fund-raising efforts elsewhere in Latin 
America, thereby shaming the colony in Mexico City into contributing additional funds. 
These were not mere handbills. Vida Espanola was a monthly magazine printed on glossy 
paper and featuring color graphics on the cover. Inside it was replete with photographs on 
nearly every page, extensive editorials, and even more extensive advertising. Its reportage on 
the events in Spain included coverage of the major battles, exposes on the latest Republican 
atrocity, and polemical attacks on prominent individuals within the Republican Government, 
as well as occasional shots at international leaders on the left such as Leon Blum. Nationalist 
military leaders were glorified, as was Calvo Sotelo, martyr of the Carlists at this time. The 
magazine was produced entirely in Mexico City and it could not have been cheap to do so. 
According to Schuler, the Falange spent forty thousand pesos a month on propaganda. 72 
Although these propagandist activities were out in the open, behind the scenes the network 
was engaged in fixing passports and possibly shipping arms. As the details of these 
operations become clear, one can see how the pigeon-holing of the various members of the 
72 Schuler, 136. 
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network begins to break down. However, that is not to say that there was a lack of 
coordination or duplication of effort. It is apparent that there was a high level of control and 
coordination, with Francisco Cay6n y Cos and Augusto Ihafiez Serrano at the center of 
operations. 
There was ample opportunity for all of these Franquistas, each contributing to the 
cause in his own way, to exchange information. The Casino Espafiol, located at Isabella 
Cat6lica 29, had long been a haunt of the elite among the Spanish colony. This was the nerve 
center of the Franquista network. A 1931 investigation, in response to the Casino's 
application for renewal of a permit, contains a description. 73 The Casino offered dominoes 
and billiards downstairs, poker and other card games (tute, paco, and trecillo) upstairs. It also 
featured a restaurant, cantina, and library. The Royal Spanish Club (Real Club Espafia) also 
kept a room on the premises, indicating a strong Carlist element. When it came time to 
celebrate Franco's victory on 2 April1939, the Spanish colony held the celebration at the 
Royal Spanish Club in the Casino Espafiol. 74 American intelligence arrived three years late to 
the party, noting in 1942 that the Falange had "succeeded in gaining direction of nearly all 
the Spanish casinos, clubs, commercial houses, and even the Spanish benevolent 
organizations." 75 
73 "El Agente No. 13 al C. Jefe del Depto. (Confidencial)," Mexico, DF, 10Feb1931. 
AGN, DGIPS, 62:15, 50. 
74 Schuler, 142. 
75 Navarro, 125 & 126nl3. This was a21Feb1942 memo by the Coordinator oflnter-
American Affairs. 
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Seven years after the 1931 report, in March 193 8, PS-11 reported on the Casino 
Aleman, Centro Vasco, and Casino Espafiol. 76 He reported political activity at all these 
centers, but gave special notice to the UNE, which had "made common cause with (se ha 
formado con) distinct Fascist elements; Requetes, Falangistas, Nationalists," including Jose 
Celorio, President of the Falange, who had abandoned his residence but remained in contact 
with these groups. PS-11 had knowledge that they sometimes held back-room meetings at the 
discount store La Galatea. In addition, and independent ofPS-11 's report, this was the 1930s 
and there was no shortage of cabarets and bordellos to host back-room meetings. Also among 
the documents is an investigation into the immigration status of cabaret owner Sabino 
Cermida Garcia, who had been in and out of the penitentiary, deported under Article 33, and 
reentered the country illicitly.77 
As one can see, the members of this Spanish colony were well to do, running in 
professional circles. Through social gathering places frequented by these elements, they were 
able to maintain a network and get things done in as inconspicuous a manner as possible. 
However, that is not to say that they were operating underground. A great deal of their work, 
above all propaganda, was out in the open. Nevertheless when engaged in activities that 
would be most harmful to their immigration status, these watering holes provided an 
innocuous alibi. 
76 "PS-11 al Jefe de la Oficina de Informaciones Politica y Social," Mexico, DF, 
16Mar1938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 17. 
77 "PS-7 al Jefe de la Oficina de Informaciones," Mexico, DF, 7Mar1938, AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64,5. 
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The raising of funds to support the Nationalist effort was perhaps the most utilitarian 
aspect of the Franquista network. Behind the colorful language, fundraising is central to the 
Workers' Committee's denuncio. According to the Committee, these Franquistas were 
"biting the hand that [fed] them." In other words, they were taking advantage of Mexican 
hospitality. Although Ibafiez led the list offundraisers, the denuncio ended with a list of 
twenty-five names classified as "other fascists and financial contributors" in Mexico City and 
twenty-one from Tampico, the primary port of Mexico's oil exportation.78 According to IPS 
records that predate the Committee's denuncio by three days, Jose Celorio had been working 
for a man by the name of Baldomero Alvarez, who had raised $11,000 for Franco and 
absconded to Spain. 79 
That very same day, Javier de Aznar was writing from Burgos, Franco's Nationalist 
headquarters in Spain, to thank don Gonzalo Martinez, Delegate of the Spanish Red Cross in 
Mexico for his work in collecting and forwarding funds. 80 This letter had been intercepted by 
Republican authorities and about a month later the Spanish Charged' Affaires in Mexico City 
was forwarding a transcription to Ignacio Garcia Tellez, the Mexican Secretary of 
Gobernaci6n, attached to an itemized list of said contributions which totaled U.S. $931.24. 
The money had been forwarded to Burgos via the Adolfo Determann-Hamburg Freinafen 
78 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 19-23 & 83-84. It should be understood that the focus of 
this thesis is on the Spanish colony of Mexico City. An equally large thesis could be written 
on the community in Tampico. 
79 "PS-13 al Jete de la Oficina de Informaci6n," Mexico, DF, 8Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 13. 
80 "Javier de Aznar a Iltmo. D. Gonzalo Martinez," Burgos, Espafia, 8Mar1938. 
DGIPS, 321:64, 120. 
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agency. 81 Aznar's letter refers to Martinez's letters numbers six and seven. Therefore there 
must have been a number of such transactions, though how many cannot be known. 
Bracketing the Charge's information regarding the Red Cross were yet more complaints 
regarding Suarez's Diario Espanol and Cay6n y Cos's Vida Espana, which were continuing 
to spread propaganda against the Republican Government, which of course the Mexican 
government was supporting. 
Vida Espanola had already been trumpeting the success of similar (though 
unbelievable) fundraising efforts in Cuba. Among the IPS files is an article from that 
magazine, praising the contribution of 40 million dollars by the Spanish colony in Cuba to 
Franco's cause. This article included a reprint of a 20 August 1937letter written at the behest 
of the Generalissimo himself, Francisco Franco, thanking the President of the Spanish 
Nationalist Committee in La Habana, Elicio Arguelles, for his good work. Vida Espanola 
followed the re-print with an attempt to shame the Spanish colony in Mexico City, asking 
"What do you think, the majority of wealthy Spanish residents of Mexico, who hope to end 
the war by demonstrating your 'heroic patriotism' by a cable of good wishes?"82 These 
money-raising schemes, in Mexico, Cuba, and throughout Latin America, point to a 
deficiency in current scholarship on Franco, Nationalist Spain, and its relationship to Latin 
America. How much money was raised for Franco? Which Latin American nations were 
Franco's strongest financial supporters? Which were the weakest? Although there can be no 
81 "Jose Loredo Aparicio, Encargado de Negocios de Espafia al Excmo. Sei'ior D 
Ignacio Garcia Tellez, Secretario de Gobernaci6n" Mexico, DF, 6Apr1938. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:64, 118-119. 
82 "Cuarenta Millones de D6lares," Vida Espanola, fecha desconocido. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:64,30. 
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argwnent as to the centrality ofthis issue, it is obviously not a central question, nevertheless 
answers to these questions could give greater knowledge to political attitudes and positions 
of strength and weakness in both the pre- and post-war political envirownent in Latin 
America, measured in terms of both money and enthusiasm. 
Obviously, financial support of the Nationalist goverwnent in Burgos was foremost in 
the minds of its most zealous proponents within the Spanish colony, not only in Mexico but 
throughout Latin America. Unfortunately for the Mexican goverwnent, the Spanish 
Embassy's transcription of the letter regarding donations through the Red Cross gave its 
recipient little to go by. Individual subscribers are not listed appurtenant to the amounts, nor 
is it apparent whether this was a slush fund for Franco's military efforts or genuine 
subscriptions to support the Red Cross on the Nationalist side of the lines. Not only does the 
Embassy fail to provide any supporting docwnentation or further direction, but the letter 
concludes with a pathetic complaint about crank telephone calls that have been received at 
the Embassy, asking that the Mexican government do what it can to make them stop. 
Two IPS docwnents link IbMez, Celorio, and Gerardo Ansoleaga, an employee of 
Euskadi, to fundraising efforts and passport fixing schemes, representing an even more direct 
manner of aid to Franco. On 25 March 1938, PS-5 filed a one page brief on IbMez and 
Ansoleaga. 83 It was now revealed that IbMez had been naturalized as a Mexican citizen on 
24 December 1935. It will be recalled that the Arechederra brothers had also been naturalized 
in September of that year. Thus there were at least three members of the network who, by 
83 "PS-5 a1 Jefe de Ia Oficina de Informacion," Mexico, DF, 25Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64, 114. 
35 
virtue of their naturalization, could not have been expelled from Mexico. Ibat'iez had been 
going back and forth from his office in the Banco de Comercio to the Portuguese Legation, 
securing passports by the latter institution. Every night, between seven and seven-thirty, 
Ibat'iez delivered the Boletin Franquista to the Casino Espaiiol. He had still been observed 
frequenting La Galatea, a "commercial house (Casa Comercial)." (La Galatea had previously 
been reported to be a discount store, i.e., "comercio de abarrotes.") The proprietors of La 
Galatea, the Marcha brothers, were known sympathizers of Franco and according to PS-5 
their establishment was a regular meeting site "for those who do not sympathize with 
Azaiia." Since attempting to sway the Chamber of Deputies and making that known in the 
Mexico City press, lbat'iez had by now "ceased these activities and now proceeds very 
cautiously." 
As for the Euskadi employee, Gerardo Ansoleaga, he had been receiving instructions 
from Angel Urraza. According to PS-5, Ansoleaga was a "very good friend ofUrraza." 
Ansoleaga had been seen frequenting the Centro Vasco and had been appointed to lead a 
commission to raise funds for Franco, by Urraza's direction. Basque himself, Gerardo 
Ansoleaga y Eguia was bominA!gerza, Vizcaya in 1886; he had entered Mexico in 1904.84 
However, since publicizing such activities developed by the UNE, PS-5 was of the opinion 
that "those individuals now lay low and have suspended their old activities, dedicating 
themselves to their realjobs."85 
84 "PS-13 a! Jefe de Ia Oficina de lnformaci6n," Mexico, DF, 8Mar1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:64,7. 
85 In Spanish: "estos individuos se cuidan mucho y han suspend/do sus antiguos 
actividades, dedidmdose actualmente a sus trabajos comerciales. " 
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Subsequent inter-office memos are not consistent with this final analysis. In the 
Centro Vasco (Basque Center), Urraza is said to have given funds to thirty Spaniards, so that 
they may "unite with franco [sic]" on 2 or 3 April, leaving on Iberian Airlines, carrying 
German and Italian passports. 86 Furthermore, in what appears to be IPS Chief Humberto 
Amaya's personal worksheet (it bears handwritten scrawls written in the margins 
summarizing agent reports), lbMiez is listed as arranging passports with both the Portuguese 
and Italian Legations, through the Agencia Comercial y Maritima. 87 This is consistent with 
the Workers' Committee denuncio, but it bears noting that that allegation was not crossed out 
on this document, thus representing a continuing working theory of Amaya's. Two names 
down from IbMiez appears the typewritten name of Jose Celorio, "Chief of the Falange 
Espafiola." Handwritten below that is "Baldomero Alvarez, Jefe Falange Espafiola," and 
directly below that is scribbled "Gerardo Ansoleaga, PS-5." Alvarez, it will be recalled, had 
been denounced by FROC in 1936, raised $11,000 for Franco, and left for Spain.88 
Obviously, at this early point in time the focus among the Franquistas was on 
supporting Franco in Spain. Portuguese and Italian passports were being used to funnel 
persounel into Spain. These numbers were so small that their purpose must have been for 
reasons other than mere fighting on the front lines otherwise it would not have been worth 
the trouble to engage in illegal activity to get them there.89 Later, it would become 
questionable whether support of Franco remained the focus. Particularly once the Second 
86 Memo de oficina sin encabeza, Iugar, o fecha. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 153. 
87 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 164-167. 
88 Supra voce, 15-16 & 33. 
89 Hugh Thomas estimates that the number of"Latin Americans and White Russian 
exiles and others ... could not have been more than 1,000 at most." He puts the number of 
Mexicans fighting in Spain for the Republic at ninety. Thomas, 980 & 984. 
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World War was underway, there was cause for concern that the network established by 
Franco was still working exclusively for Franco, or instead working as a proxy for the Axis 
in Latin Atnerica.90 The ability to arrange false passports, thereby facilitating trans-Atlantic 
travel of human intelligence assets, would have been an important means regardless of the 
end. 
What is becoming clear is that there was a healthy level of coordination between 
these various 'cells,' if one might call them that. Amaya's worksheet indicates an effort on 
his part to firm up linkages between individuals. These linkages become more apparent when 
taking a direct look at Cay6n y Cos's magazine, Vida Espanola. The propaganda content of 
this magazine is nothing unusual. It conveys the fascist version of events in Spain, 
commentary on the state of international affairs, religiously-themed articles for old Spanish 
widows, and even social pages and movie reviews. The latifundista and hacendado market is 
catered to by articles on the latest advances in cattle ranching and other agricultural pursuits. 
Beyond the content, the most useful information for the purposes of this investigation, within 
IPS's samples of Vida Espanola spanning 1936 and 1937, is found in the advertising. 
Among the advertisers in Vida Espanola are Tabacalera Mexicana, Garage New York 
(where, per the advert, one might purchase Goodrich Euskadi tires), La Carolina textile 
factory, Francisco Cilveti y Cia., La Agencia Comercial y Marltimo (Heynen, Everbusch, y 
Cia.), Jose Alvarez's La Vidrieria de Monterrey, Euskadi tennis shoes, and the ubiquitous 
Sanborn's.91 In another right-leaning magazine, Voz Nacional, which appears to have been 
90 Sub voce, 70-71. 
91 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,30,34, 36, 39, 45, 48,52 & 66. 
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established to support the presidential campaign of the Mexican politician (and of course 
former general) Juan Andreu Almazan, one may find advertisements for Goodrich, La 
Comercial insurance, Banco General, National City Bank ofNew York, and Cerveceria 
Modelo.92 Vida Espanola not only supported Francisco Franco, it praised the sacrifices of 
Germany and Italy at his side. 93 Therefore, every company who paid to advertise in Vida 
Espanola knew that they were supporting Franco financially, knew that they were promoting 
Hitler and Mussolini in the process, and, most importantly, they knew that in so doing they 
were making a political statement in opposition to the foreign policy of the Mexican 
government loud and clear. The summation of advertisers provides a firm link of 
coordination on the part of the Spanish colony in Mexico City in support of Franco. 
We have seen that Garage New York was owned by Ruido Garcia, under IPS 
investigation and implicated by the head of IPS in a kidnapping ring; La Carolina had ties to 
both the Noriega and Arechederra clans, the latter under direct investigation and the former 
by association with Cay6n y Cos; Francisco Cilveti was listed by Diario Espanol as in 
attendance at the Dosal funeral; Agencia Comercial y Maritimo was implicated in a passport-
fixing ring - Everbusch we will hear from again very soon; Euskadi was owned by Angel 
Urraza, under investigation for passport-fixing as well. A vital question that will need to be 
answered is whether or not these people had suspended their old activities and were now 
lying low, as PS-5 thought. 
92 Voz Nacional, 3 de agosto de 1939 (epoca 2, nfunero 1) AGN, DGIPS, 4:14,46,49, 
51, 52 & 61. This magazine was, according to its own editorial board listing within its pages, 
registered with the government in June 1939 (AGN, DGIPS, 4:14, 54). 
93 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 71-74. This is an untitled photo essay with some 
accompanying text. 
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In the Banco de Comercio, where Ibaf!ez Serrano's office could be found, one might 
also find the insurance company La Comercial, S.A. Their advertisement appears in the 3 
August 1939 copy of Voz Nacional, a Nationalist paper aimed at the Mexican public. By now 
the politicking had begun preparatory to the 1940 election. Voz Nacional was promoting Juan 
Andreu Almazan, the conservative challenger to Cardenas's candidate, Manuel Avila 
Camacho. La Comercial's board of directors was led by Salvador Ugarte, president of Banco 
de Comercio, with don Hipolito Signoret ofEl Palacio de Hierro and don Jesus Rivero 
Quijano of Atoyac Textil serving as vice-presidents.94 Rivero Quijano was a good friend of 
Cay6n y Cos; his name and that of Atoyac appears often in the correspondence with Pio 
Noriega. This same issue contains an advertisement for B.F. Goodrich automotive belts.95 
B.F. Goodrich, it will be recalled, had the subsidiary agreement with Urraza' s Euskadi. 
In summary, we find La Commercial advertising in Voz Nacional; the chairman of 
the board, Ugarte, is president ofthe parent company, Banco de Comercio; it is within this 
bank that Ibaf!ez maintains an office; and another member of the board of La Comercial, 
Rivero Quijano, is in close correspondence with Francisco Cay6n y Cos. This contrasts 
sharply with agent PS·S's March 1938 assessment that Franquistas within the Spauish colony 
were lying low and "dedicating themselves to their real jobs." Rather, in little over a year 
they had gone beyond merely supporting Franco in the Spanish Civil War to attempting to 
influence the outcome of the 1940 presidential election in Mexico, and this at a very early 
date in the pre-election campaigning. 
94 Anuncio, Voz Nacional, 3Aug1939, 8. AGN: DGIPS, 4:14,48. 
95 Ibid., 2. AGN, DGIPS, 4:14,46. 
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Returning to Cay6n y Cos, he was not satisfied with propagandizing in Mexico. In 
May 1938, he turned his attention to the United States, reaching out to "an old friend ... to see 
if it is possible to publish there a magazine in defense of our Holy Cause and the great 
(inmenso) Franco."96 Six days later he was writing this friend, F.V. Bustamante, advising him 
to seek out a particular issue of Father Coughlin's Social Justice dealing with the Spanish 
question and enquiring as to the feasibility of publishing an "exclusively Spanish" 
magazine.97 It is not known whether Bustamante was able to launch such a magazine, but the 
IPS records indicate that he did embark upon a speaking tour, preaching to the Spanish choir 
at the Casa de Espafia in New York.98 Again, this effort, like the establishment of Voz 
Nacional, extends beyond an attempt to build enthusiasm for Franco within the diasporal 
Spanish community. Rather, the propaganda is directed at the citizenry of the host country. 
Where Mexico was concerned, Pio Noriega had no illusions about the prospect of such 
propaganda having a positive effect. "It is not worth the pain, the work, and the risk," the old 
Porfirian latifimdista warned Cay6n y Cos. "Mexico is an enemy country."99 
Long before this exchange with Noriega, on 18 November 1936, Cay6n y Cos had 
participated as a founding member of the Spanish Anti-Communist and Anti-Jewish 
96 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos a Jose G Burgos," Mexico, DF, 6Mayl938. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:65, Torno I. 
97 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos a F. V. Bustamante," Mexico, DF, 12May1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
98 "Discurso Pronunciado por El Sr. F.V. Bustamante con Motivo de Ia Fiesta 
Celebrada e12 de Mayo de 1938 en Ia Casa de Espafia de Nueva York en Conmemoraci6n 
del Primer Aniversario de su Fundaci6n," AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
99 "Pfo Noriega a Francisco Cay6n y Cos," Villa de Higeras, NL, 8Dec1938. AGN, 
DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
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Association (AEACAJ) and was named Secretary-Genera1.100 This was a social organization 
whose aim was to combat "by all legitimate and legal means" the communist system, as well 
as ("igualmente") Judaism, "inspirer of communism." Jewish communism would be opposed 
"within and without" Mexico, "energetically and definitively, that it may not realize its aim 
to displace the legitimate economic and cultural Spanish influence in America, especially in 
Mexico." This was not a democratic association, as members were to "submit without 
discussion to the resolutions and mandates of the Junta Directiva y Asamblea General." They 
were to "preserve (conservar) the names of the members of the Junta Directiva as an 
unbreakable secret, under pain of expulsion and castigation." These statutes were conveyed 
to General Franco for his approbation in May 1937.101 Franco was also apprised of the new 
publication, Vida Espaflola. Cay6n y Cos assured the general that the Spanish colony in 
Mexico City was ninety percent rightist and that it "would be unjust, and inexact besides, to 
judge the Spanish colony by a few illiterates." He went on to complain that the Embassy was 
free to expound its views whereas "we are prohibited from expounding ours, nor commenting 
on theirs, without imminent exposure and the sure danger of being expelled." In spite of this, 
Cay6n y Cos claimed that among the Mexicans "the middle class, lawyers, doctors, 
engineers, businessmen, the same public officials, and even the majority of the National 
Army are decided partisans ofVE [Vida Espaflola]." He went on to pay a special tribute to 
the National Union of Veterans of the Revolution (UNVR). 
100 AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
101 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos a! General Francisco Franco, Jefe del Estado Nacionalista 
Espai'iol," Mexico, DF, 3May1937. AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
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Among Cay6n y Cos's effects is a manifesto published by the UNVR dated June 
1936. Claiming 100,000 members, this veterans' union proposed the following resolutions: 
(1) oppose vigorously the communist movement and the inculcation of its 
ideas in the schools of children and the entire educational program; (2) The anti-
communist campaign will, for the time being, be the principal activity of this National 
Institution and, by the same, the movements of communists in the Republic will be 
monitored to combat them, within the Law ... (3) The UNVR offers its cooperation 
and assistance to all Organizations .. .locked in struggle with Communism or with 
whatever movement of a subversive character; ( 4) The UNVR is not Fascist, nor 
Hitlerite, but Nationalist, and as such will oppose any Nazism, Fascism, Communism, 
or whatever doctrine contrary to the fundamental principles of Democracy .. .in all the 
Americas; (5) the UNVR will ... join all Groups on the American Continent who have 
this ideology to form a UNITED CONTINENTAL FRONT against Communism.102 
Whether Cay6n y Cos was actively coordinating with this group or merely approved 
of its resolutions is not clear from the archival evidence. Friedrich Schuler considers the 
coordination between the Falange and the UNVR to have been established for certain by 
1937.103 The presence of the booklet (June 1936) in Cay6n y Cos's papers, and the 
consistency of the rhetoric with the founding documents of the AEACAJ (November 1936), 
indicate a genesis a year earlier. This is not without its significance, for it places the date at 
the beginning, rather than the middle, of the Spanish Civil War. 
102 AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
103 Schuler, 78. 
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Among the most curious documents in the IPS files is a 1938letter found in Cay6n y 
Cos's possession. It bears no signature, but is addressed to G. Greco & Co., 1616 Powell 
Street, San Francisco: 104 
In response to your estimate of23 February, I have the pleasure of giving you 
my order of 40 cases of limes. 
The limes that we require should be "GREEN and of MEDIUM SIZE." 
Ship the limes by the Grace Lines steamer that calls on Manzanillo. Please 
verify with the Grace Lines agents when the next steamer arrives in that port. Please 
let me know if you intend to take the request and if not you must give it to another 
person. 
Invoice Bank of America, Columbus Branch, San Francisco, Cal., for your 
payment. 
NOTE: REPLY IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE I AM A WAITING NEWS 
FROM YOU. 105 
The shipping oflimes from a northern California port to Manzanillo, a Pacific coast 
port in Mexico that produces enough limes on its own, is suspicious in itself. Asking that the 
limes be green is equally strange. Yet it is impossible to know what the real intent of the 
letter is. The geographical placement ofManzanillo may have some significance. 
104 This company still has various listings on the internet at this writing. 
105 "Carta a! G Greco & Co.," 26Febl938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
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This would be a good place to revisit the polemicist Antonio Gasc6n Hernandez, who 
had betrayed the Republic and absconded to Acapulco, another Pacific coast port. 106 Gasc6n 
could not have chosen a better hiding place. As early as 1935, U.S. intelligence had become 
concerned by signals intelligence indicating that Japan was using the fishing fleet on 
Mexico's Pacific coast to monitor U.S. naval traffic between the Panama Canal and 
California.107 Japanese agents on Mexico's Pacific coast were not uncommon.108 In 1937, 
Mexican Sinarquistas (rural fascists) approached the German consulate in Mazatlan, another 
Pacific port, to request that airplanes and ammunition be delivered by submarine for the 
purpose of"fighting Jews and Bolschewists (sic)" after having been turned down by the 
Japanese and Spanish.109 German intelligence assets also made use of Pacific ports, and the 
Japanese, when necessity required. In August 1940 Abwehr agent Karl Berthold Franz 
Rekowsky, a former Mexican representative of German oil company Reichstelle filr 
Mineraloel, met IRA representative John McCarthy in Acapulco to plot sabotage in the 
United States. The following April another Abwehr agent, Friedrich Karl von Schleebmgge, 
fled Mexico by boarding the Heiyo Maru in Acapulco, bound for Vladivostok, when he 
feared that his cover had been blown. In September 1941 yet another Abwehr agent, Max 
106 Supra voce, 26-27. 
107 Paz Salinas, 172-173. 
108 Japanese sources confirm this. In 1941 Navy Commander Wachi Tsunezo was 
managing such a signals intelligence operation, as well as working a deal through a Mexican 
general, with whom he had made contact through a Mexican banker, to acquire ninety tons of 
mercury, of use in both bomb fuses and salt-resistant electrical switches (such as are found in 
thermostats). Even after Pearl Harbor, Wachi was in Mexico conveying information relating 
to the Arcadia Conference, gleaned from the Army-Navy Club in Washington, both by direct 
air mail and via Buenos Aires, to Tokyo. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall 
of the Ja~anese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York: Modern Library, 2003) 161-162 & 257. 
1 9 Schuler, 78. 
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Weber, boarded the Heiyo Maru in flight, this time in the port ofManzanillo.110 This route of 
communication had been enhanced due to Mexico's oil expropriation in 1938 and the Nazi· 
Soviet Pact of 1939. For a brief period of time, it was by the Acapulco-Vladivostok route that 
Mexico exported oil to Germany, thereby evading the Royal Navy's blockade in Japanese 
bottoms and on Soviet rails. 111 It was within this enviromnent that Gasc6n was fleeing from 
the Spanish Embassy and certain prosecution and that Cay6n y Cos was making a mysterious 
order of "limes" to Manzanillo. 
There is a similar letter from Cay6n y Cos to Agencias Unidas de Mexico. Here 
Cay6n y Cos explains a conversation he had with Richard Everbusch, head of the German 
Chamber of Commerce, 112 regarding the export of "CASCALOTE." Cascalote is a desert 
shrub. Cay6n y Cos asked if it might be possible to increase the concentration of 
"TANNON" in the cascalote from thirty to sixty percent which would reduce the material to 
be transported. 113 Tannon is simply nonsense. Neither letter proves anything, but the 
110 Leslie B Rout, Jr. & John F Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and 
United States Counter-Espionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick, MD: 
University Publications of America, 1986), 69-70 & 77-79. It had been McCarthy who put 
the Abwehr in contact with IRA operative Sean Russell. In August 1940, Russell and Frank 
Ryan boarded U-65 to be landed in Ireland in order to put into operation Plan Kathleen, an 
imitation of Sir Roger Casement's treasonous expedition of the First World War. The 
operation was scuttled when Russell dropped dead aboard ship due to a stomach ailment. 
There is a Spanish connection here, too, as Ryan had been head of the Irish Brigade in the 
Spanish Civil War. He had 'escaped' from Burgos Prison. He appears to have needed little 
encouragement from the SIM to fight George VI rather than Franco. Lawrence Patterson, 
Second U-Boat Flotilla (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003), 60-61. 
111 Rout & Bratzel, 54. 
112 Friederich Schuler, 138. Everbusch, it will be recalled, was a principal of the 
parent company of La Agencia Comercial y Maritimo. Supra voce, 38. 
113 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos a Agencias Unidas de Mexico, S.R.L.,'' Mexico, DF, 
20Apr1938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
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suspicious nature of each - first worrying that limes be green, next that the load-weight of 
shrubs be reduced- and their presence in the IPS files ought to be noted. 
About six weeks after ordering the "limes," and two weeks prior to the letter 
regarding cascalote, Cay6n y Cos wrote to the Archbishop of Sevilla that in Mexico "we are 
contemplating the parallelism that exists between those achievements in the beginning of 
1936 and those that are developing here in this country, as is also happening in France and 
even in the democratic Republic of the United States."114 Perhaps it was this "parallelism" 
that Cay6n y Cos had in mind the previous summer when he wrote to Monterrey that "the 
future is an ugly color, but I have the hope that it has to brighten very soon and very 
completely. There is much subterranean movement [emphasis added] and there are many 
people who are not disposed to be run over by events (dejarse arrollar)."m 
There was at this time some confusion on the part of Cay6n y Cos and Pfo Noriega as 
to the direction that Franco's policies were taking. In December 1937, Noriega jotted a quick 
note to Cay6n y Cos, suggesting that it "might be convenient to have conferences with the 
ministers of Japan, Italy, and Germany, asking for solidarity in defense of Spanish interests 
in Mexico, which are exposed to confiscation, summary (previa) expulsion, or assassination 
of its leaders."116 At the same time, Noriega was disappointed that Franco was talking to the 
English and French. "The German, Nippon, Italian pact would have," he thought, "decisive 
114 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos al Emmo. Sefior Cardenal Segura," Mexico, DF, 
9Apr1938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
115 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos al Dr. Mariano G Somonte," Mexico, DF, 13Aug1937. 
AGN, DGIPS, 321:65, Torno I. 
116 "Pfo Noriega a Francisco Cay6n y Cos," Higueras, NL, Dec1937. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:65, Torno I. 
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power if it included Spain and by the inevitable linkage (''por encadenamiento Inevitable'') 
with Portugal ... What a pity that Franco may be just a great general!" Cay6n y Cos was not in 
agreement with this, feeling that Franco was "taking a wide view." He felt that Franco "may 
go against Italy and Germany," because any "union with them will be unbreakable." Feeling 
the need to explain himself further, Cay6n y Cos wrote that "I am not completely fascist, just 
as I'm not a complete democrat. ,m 
So what was Cay6n y Cos? He was at this time sixty years of age. He was Asturian, 
born in Santander. He was an avowed anti-Semite. He was a mining engineer who also held a 
position with Compaflfa Transatlantica Espaflola. He was a product of an earlier time, where 
foreign investors had free rein in the Mexico of the Porfiriato. Yet he was also a man of the 
present and this made him a reactionary, both anti-communist and anti-Semite. Between his 
Asturian roots and his work in the mining industry, he was almost certainly anti-labor. This 
made him anti-Republican. Too old to fight in Spain, he remained in Mexico and did all he 
could to support Franco. Probably, he was not 'completely fascist' because he considered 
himself a Carlist. At the same time, he left the door open to being a democrat, but not a 
'complete democrat.' In a word, Francisco Cay6n y Cos was an elitist. 
While he and Pfo Noriega were busy solving all of Franco's international problems, 
Spanish coordination with Germany was moving along much more realistically in Tampico. 
The Workers' Committee denuncio included the allegation that La Agencia Comercial y 
Maritima was altering passenger lists before handing them over to the State Secretariat. We 
ll? "Francisco Cay6n y Cos a Pfo Noriega," Mexico, DF, 29Decl937. AGN, DGIPS, 
321:65, Torno I. 
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have just established by examination of the advertising in Vida Espanola that this agency was 
linked to the head of the German Chamber of Commerce, Richard Everbusch, liS (and that 
Cayon y Cos was busy procuring a shrubbery for him). It will be recalled that this agency 
was also implicated in coordinating with lbMez fixing passports with the Portuguese and 
Italian Legations. The aforementioned letter from the Spanish Charge, concerning Luciano 
Arechederra Quintana, Ansoleaga, and Gascon, reiterated and expanded these charges. 119 
According to Loredo, the Franquista network was closely linked to the Germans. Jose 
Celorio was in direct contact with both Franco and the German Embassy. Moises Sola, 
"titular agent of Franco," was working with IbMez in connection to the passport fixing, thus 
tied to the Germans as well. In Veracruz, a number of men were implicated in espionage, 
subversive relations with the Germans, and a failed assassination attempt. Also named in the 
letter are Antonio Gascon, Braulio Suarez, Mario Fernandez, Arechederra, Jose Castedo, 
Cayon y Cos, and Genaro Riestra, "Secretary of the UNE and organizer of the recent fascist 
marches." IbMez is listed as a recruiter in addition to his organizational duties. Arechederra 
and Castedo are accused of coordinating with Mexican fascists. The latter, director of Vida 
Espanola, was described by the Workers' Committee as having "an obscure history of a 
parasite, living off borrowed money and women." The Embassy held that he wrote under a 
pseudonym in the Mexican fascist press. In an apparently unrelated affair, except for the 
date, there is also record of a Manuel Barreiro Gonzalez, listed as Spanish by nationality 
(probably Galician by his paternal name), born in 1897, who entered Mexico in 1909. Now a 
liS Supra voce, 38. 
119 "Jose Loredo Aparicio, Encargado de Negocios, Embajada de Espafia, a! Sr. Jefe 
de Ia Oficina de Informacion Politica y Social de Ia Secretarfa de Gobernacion," Mexico, DF, 
16Mar1938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64,92. This time Cayon y Cos is a "padrote" rather than a 
"souteneur." 
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resident of Tampico, the Governor ofTarnaulipas sought his expulsion for receiving financial 
contributions "for particular elements of the Spanish rebel movement."120 
If the latter allegation has any relation with the former, it is in the timing. The oil 
expropriation was in February 1938 and all of these allegations and denuncios carne to light 
in March and April. Rooted in domestic politics, the expropriation was a severe complication 
to Mexico's foreign policy. Following the pattern of the railroad expropriation of the 
previous year, a labor dispute prompted the Cardenas Government to inject itself on the 
situation and, in the name of the national interest, take over the industry. For President 
Cardenas, it was not only a question of national interest, but "national honor."121 As with the 
railroads, it was foreign interests in control of the assets and they who were imposed upon. 
However, preservation of national honor at home led to its conflation abroad. Before the 
expropriation, Mexico was able to oppose fascist aggression in the League ofNations 
morally and, once that aggression became unleashed in a civil war in Spain, there was 
nothing inconsistent in Mexico's idealistic support of Republican Spain (an idealism that the 
future Allied powers would not permit themselves). However, by going forward with the 
nationalistically motivated expropriation, Mexico placed herself in an awkward position. She 
was completely alienated from Britain and commercially alienated from the United States. 
This left the Germans to purchase Mexican oil. How could the Mexican government pursue 
Spanish Franquistas for collaboration with the Germans when it was doing the same? Thus, 
120 Arcadio Ojeda Garcia, El Oficio Primera [Departamento de Migraci6n], 
Memorandum, Mexico, DF, 4Aprl938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 147. 
121 Alan Knight, U.S. -Mexican Relations, 1910-1940: An Interpretation [Monograph 
Series 28] (San Diego, CA: Center for U.S. Mexican Studies, University of California, San 
Diego, 1987), 84-86 & Paz Salinas, 3. 
50 
by going through with the expropriation the Cardenas government had weaved for itself a 
tangled web and this is reflected in both the IPS documents regarding the Falangistas and the 
government's inaction against them. 
This web would eventually extend to the ejidos in the La Laguna. Featuring both 
irrigation works and collectivized farming, this cotton growing region was the centerpiece of 
the Cardenas administration. In January 1939 there was an investigation into more Embassy 
allegations, this time relating to "seditious activity" in Torreon, the hub of La Laguna. 
According to the allegations, these Franquistas - Asturians and Galicians it was noted- were 
attacking the meeting centers of the Spanish and Mexican governments and propagating 
alarmist news against the Banco de Credito Ejidal and the stability of the Cardenas 
Government. Also alleged was a connection between these elements and those in Tampico, 
who were in communication via a German boat in that port with the Falange.122 This 
occurred while there was a transition in the leadership of both IPS and the Gobernaci6n, with 
Cipriano Arriola replacing Amaya in the former, and Euquerio Guerrero replacing Garcia 
Tellez at the latter. In response to these new allegations, as with the old allegations, the 
Mexican government did nothing. 
Given that the level of proof that the law requires for deportation is not nearly as 
severe as what the law requires in a criminal trial, it is reasonable to conclude that in the case 
of the Spanish colony there was sufficient evidence for a significant number of deportations 
under Article 33. Money was being pillaged from the Red Cross via a German travel agency, 
122 "Cipriano Arriola, por el Jefe de Ia Oficina, el Encargado a! Jefe del Depto. de 
Gobernaci6n," Mexico, DF, 29Jan1939. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 172-174. 
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affiliated with the head of the German Chamber of Commerce, who in turn was linked to 
Francisco Cay6n y Cos. Through their propaganda organs, the Franquistas were raising 
additional funding for the Nationalists, against whom the legitimate, if highly dysfunctional, 
Republican govermnent was fighting with aid from the Mexican Government. Through the 
advertising in these organs, it was easy to determine who was participating in this aid. One of 
the advertisers, Garage New York, was linked to Ruido Garcia, a man implicated in 
kidnapping and of particular interest to IPS. In the meantime, Ibafiez, Ansoleaga, and Urraza 
were engaged in passport fixing, recruitment, and smuggling of human intelligence assets. 
lbMiez- a naturalized Mexican citizen linked to Mexican nationalists in his own right- had 
an office in the Banco de Comercio, along with La Comercial, and La Comercial had been 
advertising in such Mexican nationalist papers. Taken as a whole, the entire network was 
most certainly seditious. Worse, there were also links connecting these individuals to 
subversive activities in Tampico and Torre6n, including the intimidation of peones now 
working the cotton fields of La Laguna. If the Spanish colony was engaged in such 
subversive activity, directly against the Mexican govermnent's foreign policy, why were 
there no deportations? In the case of the Arechederras and IbMiez, why were there no arrests? 
For a possible explanation to that question, it is helpful to leave the archival record of IPS 
and look elsewhere. 
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Chapter 4 - Franquista Financial Connections in Mexico 
In her 1982 book, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico, Nora 
Hamilton observed that: 
The role of the Cardenas government in establishing conditions for private 
capitalist accumulation has in turn raised questions among analysts of Mexican 
history, who have questioned the extent to which this period represents a departure 
from previous regimes. Some suggest that even the more radical policies of the 
Cardenas administration were oriented to the interest of capitalism, and that Cardenas 
was simply continuing the orientation of his predecessors toward private capitalist 
development with considerably more foresight and vision. 123 
One aspect of this capital accumulation was a burgeoning insurance industry. I have 
already noted in passing the preponderance of insurance companies linked to Franquista 
elements under investigation by IPS. In 1935, a new law was passed which gave control over 
the insurance industry to the Ministry of Finance. The investment of reserves and capital by 
insurance companies were now restricted to Mexican goods and services. Although Mexico 
had been previously dominated by foreign firms, many such firms left the country after this 
legislation was enacted leaving the field open to new "domestic" investors. According to 
Hamilton, "These proliferated in the next few years, in many cases with technical personnel 
123 Hamilton, 139. 
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who remained in Mexico after the foreign companies left. Like other financial institutions, 
insurance companies proved to be an immensely profitable investment. "124 
As early as October 1936, Manuel G6mez Morin was gloating over this fact. Writing 
a friend in France, he spoke of many "systems of cooperation and collaboration ... making it 
possible to achieve things which would have seemed impossible" beforehand. 125 G6mez 
Morin was a co-investor in Sofimex, with Angel Urraza and the Ignacio Hornik, the Swiss 
vice-president of the New York office ofltalian General Insurance Company. 126 G6mez and 
Urraza were stake-holders in Banco de Londres. The Arechederras were also a party to 
investment in this bank by virtue of the eight percent share held by C. Noriega y Cia. 
Hamilton gives the proportion of investment in Banco de Londres.in 1940 as: Cia. General de 
Aceptaciones, 28 percent; JB Ebrard/Maximino Michel, 22.5 percent; Angel Urraza!Cia. 
Hulera (sic) Euskadi, 15 percent; Trapaga, Garcia y Cia. 11 percent; Sres. C Noriega y Cia., 
8 percent; Sociedad Financiera Mexicana, 6.5 percent; Lie. Manuel G6mez Morin, 4.5 
percent; Enrique Sada Muguerza, 2 percent; Alfonso Vega, one percent; La Provincial, one 
percent. 127 
The presence of Enrique Sada Muguerza's name on this list ought to be recognized. 
From Monterrey, the Garza Sada family had established Grupo Cuauhtemoc in order to 
distance their names from their political activities, above all the quashing oflabor unions. 
The Garza Sadas were alleged to have supported the Camisas Doradas, a violent Mexican 
124 Ibid., 204-205. 
125 Ibid., 184. 
126 Supra voce, 17. 
127 Hamilton, 319. 
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fascist group, and in February 1936 had been part of a notable controversy with President 
Cardenas over a lock-out at their Vidrierfa Monterrey glass factory. 128 La Vidrierfa was an 
advertiser in Vida Espanola, though the proprietor was given as Jose Alvarez.129 Compaiiia 
General de Aceptaciones, the leading shareholder in Banco de Londres, was a subsidiary of 
Grupo Cuauhtemoc making the Garza Sada family, as Hamilton states, "a majority block of 
shareholders" in the bank. However, Hamilton regards Gomez as the driving force in the 
assembling of investors. "The Banco de Londres/Sofimex group," Hamilton tells us, "had 
been largely engineered though Manuel Gomez Morin and undoubtedly constituted the major 
example of the systems of cooperation and collaboration to which he had referred."130 Aside 
from consorting with known Falangistas, Gomez was the founder of Accion Nacional, which 
Henderson calls a "traditionalist, non-fascist, anticommunist, and anti-totalitarian alternative 
to the party of the Revolution."131 Given the pro-Franco linkage established herein, this 
Catholic group could hardly be termed "non-fascist" or "anti-totalitarian." 
Banco de Comercio is also linked to the Falange. That institution was part of the 
BUDA group, consisting of RaUl Bailleres, Salvador Ugarte, Mario Dominguez, and Ernesto 
Amescua. These men were linked to both Banco de Comercio and Credito Minero y 
Mercantil. It will be remembered that Augusto Ibaftez Serrano kept an office in Banco de 
Comercio, as did the insurance company La Commercial. La Commercial was an advertiser 
in Voz Nacional and Salvador Ugarte, of the BUDA group, sat on the board with Jesus 
Rivero Quijano, a friend of Francisco Cayon y Cos. 
128 Ibid., 209-210. 
129 Supra voce, 38. 
130 Hamilton, 212. 
131 Henderson, 1 09. 
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Banco de Comercio indirectly owned the Banco de Credito Ejidal, in Torreon. This 
coup was scored in 1937 when the Ejidal Bank was unable to obtain loans from U.S. banks. 
In response, Banco de Mexico- Mexico's central bank- engineered a deal by which Banco 
de Comercio, Banco Nacional de Mexico, and Banco Mexicano would capitalize the Ejidal 
Bank. 132 This was consistent with Banco de Comercio policy, whereby it established a local 
footprint across the country by either opening themselves or acquiring interest in banks in the 
Mexican countryside, "a policy," Hamilton notes, "which has increased its local control of 
regional financial resources."133 The deal allowing Banco de Comercio to acquire interest in 
Banco de Credito Ejidal is of interest because Torreon was the site of the seditious activity 
against the ejidal project in the Embassy's last complaint in January 1939- by direction of 
the Falange and with the assistance of the Nazis if we are to believe the EmbassyY4 
By 1939, the Mexican Government appears to have been a direct participant in the 
collaborative financial schemes within which the Franquistas had embedded themselves. 
Nacional Financiera, the government's development bank 
began to buy and place bonds and other securities of private banks and 
industries as well as government securities; in 1939 its securities included those of the 
Banco Nacional de Mexico, Banco de Londres y Mexico, the Banco de Comercio, 
and several industrial firms established during the Porfiriato: Fundidora Monterrey (a 
steel foundry), Cia. Industrial de Orizaba (a textile company), Cerveceria 
132 Hamilton, 193. 
133 Ibid., 203. 
134 Supra voce, 51. 
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Cuauhtemoc (a brewery owned by the Garza Sada family) and Buen Tono (a tobacco 
company).m 
Three of these entities, Banco de Londres, Banco de Comercio, and Buen Tono (by 
virtue of advertising in Vida Espanola) have been directly linked to the Franquista network. 
Cuauhtemoc has been linked indirectly. 
There were also allegations related to sugar concerns in Puebla. On the same IPS 
inter-office memo relating to Angel Urraza's project to smuggle thirty Spaniards out of the 
country bearing German and Italian passports via Iberian Airlines, there is also a note of a 
recruitment project in Puebla carried out by "The Society of Count Ciriaco, representative of 
Azucar, S.A."136 At this time, former U.S. consul William Jenkins was owner of Atencingo 
and other sugar holdings in Puebla, acquired through foreclosure. Jenkins had been 
collaborating with the governor ofPuebla, Maximino Avila Camacho (brother of the future 
president, Manuel) in retarding Cardenista land reform by redistributing land to his 
employees rather than local villagers. Jenkins and Espinosa Iglesias later took over Banco de 
Comercio, though this was in the 1950s.137 Owing to the lack of analysis in the IPS records, it 
is impossible to know whether Urraza's passport-fixing activities were linked to the 
recruitment effort in Pueb1a. It must suffice to say that the two incidents appear on the same 
memorandum. Further evidence of what was happening in Puebla probably exists somewhere 
in the IPS archive. 
135 Hamilton, 207. 
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Allen Chase's 1943 account of the Falange in the Americas, written with documents 
that had been smuggled by exiled Spanish Republicans, supports much of what has been 
alleged here. According to Chase, IbMiez on occasion signed his letters "Personal 
Representative of Generalissimo General Franco." In spite of his mail coming to Calle 
Articulo 123, address of Banco Comercio, "the best place to find him," according to Chase, 
"is in the office he maintains at the Portuguese Legation in Mexico City." Chase cites IbMiez 
as the direct link between the Nazis in Europe and the "secret fascist armies on the American 
border," in constant contact with Colonel Sanz Agero, the Spanish Minister in Guatemala 
and head of the Falange in Central America. 138 This assertion is confirmed by American 
intelligence reports that were being developed at the same time that Chase was preparing his 
book. According to Navarro, "by 1942, U.S. and British military intelligence agents were 
certain that Spanish Falangists were conductlhg espionage operations on behalf of the Axis 
powers and transmitting their reports through the Spanish legation in Guatemala."139 Of 
course, these sources confirm such connections only after the United Sates had come into the 
war. IPS documents indicate that the links between the Falange and Axis interests had been 
established during the Spanish Civil War, though they say nothing of "secret fascist armies 
on the American border." 
For his part, Chase gives IbMiez's three close lieutenants as Alejandro Quijano, 
G6mez Morin, and Carlos Prieto, lawyers all. 140 G6mez Morin, it will be recalled, was an 
associate of Angel Urraza in Sofimex and Banco de Londres. It should also be recalled that 
138 Chase, 152. 
139 Navarro, 126. 
14° Chase, 151. 
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there was also a Jesus Rivero Quijano who was on the board of La Comercial, owner of 
Atoyac Textil and a friend of Cay6n y Cos. Rivero Quijano was concerned about getting 
Atoyac's name mixed up in Falangista activities, as Cay6n y Cos complained repeatedly to 
an associate in Spain that an order had been given that the company's name would not appear 
in any Falangista publication. 141 Nevertheless, Rivero Quijano's name does appear in the list 
of board members in the La Comercial advertisement in Voz Nacional, the pro-Aimazan 
daily.142 
At this point, there should be no doubt that there was a network of Franquistas 
operating in Mexico and that they had embedded themselves in Mexico's most important 
fmancial institutions. Some were associated with the Falange directly; others appear to have 
attempted to keep their distance publicly while contributing to the Falangista 
communications and recruitment operations in private. Although I have provided no detailed 
analysis of the propaganda within Vida Espanola, I have tried to make clear that the 
magazine made no attempt to disguise its support of and affiliation with the Falange, even 
going so far as to incorporate the yoke and arrows of the Falange into the symbology of its 
cover art. Therefore, any entity advertising in Vida Espanola was making public its support 
for Francisco Franco and the Falange. 
Although an attempt has been made in the foregoing chapters to subdivide these 
groups into categories of status and participation, in reality such a division of labor did not 
141 "Francisco Cay6n y Cos al Seflor don Jose Castedo," Mexico, DF, 27Nov1937 & 
"Francisco Cay6n y Cos a! Seflor don Jose Castedo," Mexico, DF, 18Dec1937. AGN, 
DGIPA, 321:65, Torno I. 
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really exist. It was convenient to make such distinctions by way of introduction of the topic; 
however, there were wealthy elites engaged in raising money, illegal activity, and 
propaganda. Those whom I have termed "operators" were engaged in all activities as well. 
There were a few pure propagandists, but in my view that merely indicates that their talents, 
if they may be called such, were focused in the most useful direction. Notwithstanding how 
the members are qualified, the seditious nature of the work that the network engaged in 
supporting Franco is self-evident. They raised money by a variety of means, including illicit 
transfers from the Red Cross, revenue from Vida Espanola and other propagandist organs, 
and direct fundraising efforts among the community, in the Casino Espaiiol, Centro Vasco, 
and elsewhere. Multiple persons under investigation were involved in passport-fixing, in 
concert with the Portuguese, Germans, and Italians, ensuring that both Franco's agents and 
new recruits could travel unimpeded. They distributed a phenomenal amount of propaganda, 
aimed not only at aiding and abetting Franco but also at turning public opinion in Mexico 
against the Cardenas foreign policy. Some of this was apparently done in collaboration with 
Mexican veterans' groups. Moreover, the cross-over of advertisers from Vida Espanola to 
Voz Nacional indicates the difficulty in parsing out those who had firm links to the Falange 
and those who were merely Mexican supporters of Almazan. The cross-over is sufficient to 
call into question whether such a distinction ought to be made. Cay6n y Cos was even 
attempting to expand their propagandist efforts to the United States, parroting. the extremist 
views of Father Coughlin. There can be no doubt that both Cay6n y Cos and lbafl.ez were 
actively collaborating with the Nazis, particularly with the head of the German Chamber of 
Commerce, Richard Everbusch. 
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Then there are the allegations regarding La Laguna. If the Spanish Embassy is to be 
believed, the Spanish colony was collaborating with German human and signals intelligence 
in Tampico, turning the capabilities that these provided on the ejidal agricultural collectives 
in Torreon. This would have extended the network's goal beyond mere support for Franco, 
something to be expected from a diasporal group such as the Spanish colony in Mexico City, 
to encompass a secondary goal of weakening the Mexican government. However, it was also 
being done in coordination with a nation- Germany- with whom the Mexican government 
was attempting to increase trade following the loss of traditional export markets after the 
expropriation. 143 
The Franquista network had also imbedded itself deeply within Mexico's financial 
institutions. Angel Urraza, whose involvement in the most seditious of the Spanish colony's 
activities is borne out by the IPS record, was a significant shareholder in Banco de Londres, 
in association with the Garza Sada and Noriega families and with Manuel Gomez Morin, the 
founder of Accion Nacional. Hamilton's research into Mexican fmancial structures, much of 
it gleaned from financial statements that were public knowledge, tells us that Gomez Morin 
was integral to the formation of the investment group Sofunex. Chase, using Republican 
informants, claims that Gomez Morin was working for Ibanez, though the inverse seems 
143 Paz Salinas, 27-28 & 148-149. Noting that much of this trade was done on a barter 
basis, Paz considers the Abwehr "the most important espionage agency" in Mexico. 
Nevertheless, she concludes the expropriation was not the source of this activity, but rather a 
contingency. Rout and Bratzel see German espionage as "inextricably tied" to the petroleum 
issue. Rout & Bratzel, 54-55. This may be a tempest in a teapot, as it has been noted that 
Mexican production had been in decline since the early 1920s, due to exhaustion of reserves 
that could be tapped using the drilling technology of that era. See Stephen Haber, Noel 
Maurer, and Armando Razo, "When the Law Does Not Matter: The Rise and Decline of the 
Mexican Oil Industry," The Journal of Economic History 63:1 (Mar2003) 1 & 10-16. 
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equally probable. Where IPS investigations of the Falange are concerned, Gomez Morin's 
name is conspicuously absent. Oddly enough, it was not the Banco de Londres/Sofimex 
interests but the Banco de Comercio interests that were advertising in Franquista, and later 
pro-Almazan, propaganda. All that this study has determined is that there was a Mexican 
financial network that included Franquista supporters. At the same time, the potential for 
conflicts of interest was profound. Corruption in Mexico is always taken as a given. What I 
am arguing here is that increased knowledge of how that corruption operated, and perhaps 
continues to operate, has value. How the Franquista network was exerting its influence ought 
to be the subject of further research. For example, given the potential for indirect pressure on 
the Ejidal Bank by virtue of its debt to Banco de Comercio - and the Spanish Embassy was 
alleging that this was happening -this would be a good place to start. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
lfiPS had been ignoring the Franquista presence in Mexico, there would not be 
enough evidence to write this paper. Since it was collecting information on the group, the 
question arises as to whether they were looking in the right places. Had they overlooked 
anything? Were they properly analyzing the information they had collected? Given the 
archival evidence, it would appear that IPS agents had been tasked properly, though this 
statement cannot be made without some caveats. It appears that the wealthy amongst the 
Franquista elements were treated differently than the rank and file. The Vega family, so 
prominent at the Dosal funeral, comes under no close scrutiny. Although the most danming 
evidence the IPS possessed was related to Angel Urraza's coordination with the Italians and 
Germans - on a political and military level, not, as would have been acceptable to the 
Cardenas government at this time, of a commercial nature as with Cay6n y Cos - this 
information was not passed down to the agents so that they might hone their field 
investigation. IPS reports ofUrraza's comings and goings at the Centro Vasco and other 
UNE meeting places were driven by his presence there, not by instruction from above. The 
Arechederra brothers at La Carolina mill and Francisco Cay6n y Cos also fit into this 
category. There are over two hundred pages ofCay6n y Cos's correspondence on archival 
record, but no field investigation except to ascertain his whereabouts. Both investigations, 
that of March 1938 and that of March 1939, were allowed to languish. This lack of 
persistence indicates that IPS and Gobernaci6n had other priorities. 
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One would think that when all those pages belonging to Cay6n y Cos were transferred 
from Arriola to Guerrero (IPS to Gobernaci6n) in January 1939, there would have been a 
thorough investigation of his ongoing activities. Such a deficiency is a shame, because the 
agents appear to have been a highly motivated force from which the Mexican govermnent 
might have benefited. As with the tasking of agents, it is difficult to say this with surety 
because the archival record contains so little analysis either by the agents themselves or their 
superiors. Remember, the first task ofiPS was the collection of infotmation. There are 
nevertheless a few examples of such analysis. On 10 March 1938, as part of the investigation 
driven by Dosal's funeral, the Workers' Committee denuncio, and similar but more focused 
complaints from the Spanish Embassy, Agent PS-7 reported on the activities of Gilberto 
Ruido Garcia, his meeting with Estanislau Vega, Ismael Vega, four others by name, "and 
many others, who soon will give me their names."144 A year later, nearly to the day, Agent 
PS-17' s report on the Torre6n ejidal allegations concluded that "As can be seen, such 
flagrant abuses of the hospitality and of the laws of the country merit at least that the 
Executive might make use of the faculties conferred unto it by Article 33 of the 
Constitntion."145 
It is hard to tell whether Agent PS-15 shared this view. In July 1938 he paid a visit to 
the Falange headquarters in Mexico City, using the proper countersign to gain entry at 6:00 
pm. The occasion was the celebration of the second anniversary of Franco's rising. 
According to PS-15, there were over a thousand people present "of Spanish nationality," 
though he was careful to note that no one observed spoke of "political issues or relations 
144 AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 15. 
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with our country." Films were screened showing the events in Spain "and scenes of the 
fratricidal war." Amidst the festivities, PS-15 was able to poke around, checking desks and 
file cabinets for arms or other incriminating evidence, of which he found none. He was 
unobserved, or so he thought. At about 8:45, he was approached and asked, "Senor Clave 
(Mr. Spy), would you be so kind as ("tiene la bondad'') to proceed to Mr. Celorio's office?" 
Once seated, PS-15 was asked if his visit was official or personal in nature, given that foreign 
elements (i.e., non-Spanish) were strictly prohibited from entering the building. PS-15 
termed his visit as "extra-official," explaining that he merely wanted a volume of the history 
of the war that was being distributed as a part of the festivities. The Falange representative, 
who is not named by the report, parried this thrust by explaining that the Falange was not 
responsible for the volume, that they did not approve it for distribution, and that its purpose 
was to sustain the war effort, "something that is inexact." He went on to read a passage from 
the Falange regulations that strictly precluded members from speaking of politics relating to 
nations in which the members may reside. The conversation went on unti110:30, at which 
point the Falangistas passed along the best wishes of Mr. Celorio and "of a friend of yours 
[of a friend of Amaya's]," giving PS-15 samples of their best propaganda. "It pleases me," 
PS-15 reported to Amaya, "to place the above within your knowledge, for such purposes that 
may create opportunities. "146 
The discretion posed by this report emblemizes the difficult position in which PS-15, 
Amaya, Gobernaci6n, and ultimately President Cardenas were placed. Although exposed, 
146 "PS-15 a! C. Humberto Amaya, Jefe de Ia Oficina de lnformaci6n Social y 
Politica," Mexico, DF, 20Jull938. AGN, DGIPS, 321:64, 169-171. In Spanish, "Lo cual me 
es grato poner en conocimiento de usted para los fines que crea oportunidades." 
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PS-15 handled himself well, as did the Falangistas who had exposed him. Surely their name-
dropping by way of reference to a friend ofHumberto Amaya's put PS-15 in an 
uncomfortable position. Amaya was probably made just as uncomfortable. As for the 
leadership ofiPS and Gobernaci6n, it is hard to say in this limited study what went into the 
decision to replace Humberto Amaya with Cipriano Arriola at IPS, and Ignacio Garcia Tellez 
with Euquerio Guerrero at Gobernaci6n, but it can be shown that such a transition took place 
and that it took place at the end of 1938 or beginning of 1939, just as the Republic of Spain 
was in its death throes. Surely there were far more important domestic issues involved, 
personality conflicts, and inter-party politics - any number of reasons that would rise to a 
level of importance above what was happening in Spain. Nevertheless, the change in 
leadership at the head of Mexico's top institutions of internal security represents that 
something was happening within the Cardenas administration. The question is not how that 
shift in leadership was affected by the policy vis-a-vis Spain but how the shift at the top 
affected government policy formation downstream, particularly before, during, and after the 
1940 election. Although writing in the context of American and German activities in Mexico, 
Navarro contends that "the efforts of the Mexican intelligence bureaucracy during the period 
from 1939 to 1942 were deeply conflicted."147 This conflicted nature is likewise evident with 
respect to Spain from 1936 to 1939. 
A look at the expulsion policy of the Mexican government is even more revealing. 
Under Article 33 of the 1917 Constitution, Cardenas could have foreign nationals expelled 
practically on a whim. Pablo Yankelevich has noted a significant decline in its use from the 
147 Navarro, 176. 
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tenn of Alvaro Obreg6n (1921-1925) to that of Cardenas. Obreg6n was responsible for half 
of Mexico's 1,081 expulsions from 1917 to 1934, with a peak in 1922 of nearly three 
hundred. A quarter of these were Spaniards.148 By contrast, the Cardenas government (1934-
1940) expelled sixteen total, six of them Spaniards, "in spite of hundreds of denuncios." Part 
of this was due to a change of policy wherein, as Yankelevich explains, an undesirable was 
"invited" to leave the country. 149 However, in the fuller analysis Yankelevich is of the 
opinion that the complexity of business and family ties lay behind Article 33's decline in use, 
where Spaniards were concerned: 
Apart from other groups offoreign nationals, Spaniards not only were the 
largest, but their social networks involved so many empresarial associations with 
familial and personal bonds with Mexican citizens. The political cost of a mass 
expulsion would be so high that surely it was not even considered ... Hundreds of 
members of the Spanish colony were under observation, but it was a long way from 
here to an expulsion; above all, because the government had reliable information as to 
the superficial commitment that the majority of the colony had for Franquista 
activities.150 
Although one may agree with that statement in general, it may also be said that 
Yankelevich's conclusion reveals an analysis that is accurate, yet imprecise. We have seen 
that there were, in fact, complex familial and personal bonds between the Spanish colony and 
148 Yankelevich, 2004, 46-47. 
149 Ibid., 49. 
150 Ibid., 58-59. The last phrase: "porque el gobierno tenia infonnaci6n confiable del 
superficial compromiso que el grueso de Ia colonia tuvo para con las actividades del 
franquismo." 
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the Mexican population. Jose Vega del Cueto was married to a Mexican. Jose Celorio was 
born in Mexico, though he claimed Spanish citizenship. Angel Urraza was involved in highly 
complex financial arrangements with Manuel G6mez Morin and other Mexican elites. 
However, the "commitment" to Franquista activities on the part of some in the Spanish 
colony in Mexico City (and amongst the Mexican elites) was not "superficial." These were 
serious businessmen who did not contribute hard-eamed funds to a cause without expectation 
of results. They may have made donations to charitable causes simply for the sake of keeping 
up appearances, but political investments were anything but superficial. More to the point, 
the part of the colony whose commitment was not superficial was the most powerful and 
influential by virtue of its wealth, as this research has shown. 
Historians have been tempted to make too much of the Cardenas administration's 
expulsion of the Falange "leadership." For instance, Friedrich Schuler calls the decision a 
"drastic public stance."151 However the three who were expelled- Alejandro Villanueva 
Platas, Jose Celorio Ortega, and Genaro Riestra Diaz152 -hardly comprise the nerve center of 
the Franquista organization. Villanueva, an official envoy of the Falange, had only recently 
arrived in Mexico; the role of Celorio and Riestra appears from the IPS record to have been 
ceremonial. To his credit, Yankelevich does not put too much stock in the significance of the 
three deportees. 
Nora Hamilton's analysis bears a similar imprecision with regard to Spanish presence 
in Mexico. She only credits Spanish influence insofar as the colony supported the newly 
151 Schuler, 142. 
152 Yankelevich, 60. 
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emergent National Action Party (PAN), "formed in 1939 at the instigation of Manuel G6mez 
Morin [attracting] conservative professionals, intellectuals, merchants and industrialists 
(including the Garza Sada interests in Monterrey), as well as important elements of the 
Spanish colony in Mexico, chiefly professionals and businessmen."153 Hamilton relegates 
Betty Kirk's allegation ofFalangista control of PAN to a footnote and gives undue (in my 
view) credence to the effect of the deportations (all three of them.) Here she seems to agree 
with the assessment of Pierre Boa!, US Embassy Counsel, who asserted in a report to 
Washington in November 1939, that the Mexican government had the fascist community 
"under control."154 It is worth considering that by ending her study in 1940 Nora Hamilton 
may have forced herself into the conclusion that "electoral" defeat of Almazan and the 
Panistas who supported him spelled the end of outside influence. Perhaps if Hamilton had 
extended her work beyond 1940 she would have discovered Spanish influence outside PAN 
(and in the Mexican financial sector.) In her view of Spanish influence, it appears that in this 
she is taking her cue from Friedrich Schuler who saw the deportation as "severe" and claims 
that in October 1939 the Falange was "paralyzed" by the Nazi-Soviet Pact and Franco's order 
for the Falange to avoid activity that might be interpreted as a violation of Spanish neutrality. 
Schuler supports this assertion of"paralysis" with a U.S. intelligence report that the Falange 
had declined as "an active force for propaganda and infiltration of German and Italian 
influence,'' given at roughly the same time as the Boal assessment used by Hamilton. 
153 Hamilton, 261. 
154 Ibid., 262fnl5. Pierre Boa! was Counselor ofthe U.S. Embassy in Mexico City at 
this time. 
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Schuler concludes that "the Falange, as a social movement. .. had stopped being a threat to 
Cardenismo."155 
Here the historical analysis has risen above imprecision to become fundamentally 
flawed. Because Schuler, Hamilton, and other historians are basing their analysis on U.S. 
intelligence reports of the era, their analysis is only as good as those reports. American 
intelligence was not interested in the maintenance or decline of Cardenismo nor of the 
Spanish Republic. The United States was interested in stopping "German and Italian 
influence" in Mexico. By using that metric as a measurement of Falange strength or 
weakness, American intelligence and subsequent historical analysis fails to confront the vital 
interest of the Falange, which was not in Mexico in 1939 (nor was it ever) for the purpose of 
furthering the international ambitions of Hitler and Mussolini. In their analysis of later 
events, Rout and Bratzel follow the same pattern, concluding that "there is no evidence that 
[Franco's] SIM (Servicio de Investigaci6n Militar) agents in Mexico and Central America 
provided any data of substance to the Germans"156 (in 1941) and that "the idea of having 
Spain's SIM replace the German intelligence organization was prudent, but it came too late 
to have any salutary effects"157 (in 1943). The Falange had arisen in Mexico to support 
Francisco Franco. lfthe oil expropriation in 1938 opened possibilities for German commerce, 
by which the Falange could profit, so much the better. Given the links established herein 
between Cay6n y Cos and Richard Everbusch, the head of the German Chamber of 
Commerce, be they the latter's advertising in pro-Franco propaganda or the former's 
155 Schuler, 142-143. 
156 Rout & Bratzel, 82. 
157 Ibid., 95. 
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correspondence with regard to shipments of "cascalote," this was in fact happening. 
However, the Falange in Mexico was not Hitler's play-thing, any more than it was in Spain. 
There was no primacy of German interests above Spanish interests in Mexico, and probably 
Latin America in general. 
There were two events in this period that a review ofFalangista activity during the 
Spanish Civil War helps to clarify: the oil expropriation and the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The 
former placed Mexico in an awkward position internationally. Washington refused to 
purchase Mexican oil, with Germany emerging as the dominant purchaser in its place. Once 
the war began, the British Admiralty was able to blockade Mexican exports effectively. Not 
only did this interrupt the revenue stream of the Mexican government at a time critical to 
Cardenista reforms, but it also put an ambivalent stamp on Cardenista foreign policy. 
Whereas the Mexican government had been an outspoken critic of Axis aggression and a 
military opponent of Germany by proxy in Spain, at the same time the government was 
selling petroleum to Berlin via the Soviet Union. At home, the expropriation was not long in 
estranging the working class from the government, as govetmnent now took the place of the 
corporation in labor negotiations. In this sense, the expropriation should not be viewed as an 
achievement of Cardenismo, but rather as a severe complication. 
The Nazi-Soviet Pact was equally problematic in Mexico because it exposed the 
governments in both Berlin and Moscow as the opportunists that they were. On the left, it 
destroyed unity and replaced the idealism of the early Cardenista years with a cynicism to 
which Mexicans were very accustomed historically -a cynicism that has its roots in both the 
Spanish Quijote and the Aztec Malinche. Thus the left in Mexico was alienated from the 
Communist International and the Soviet Union, with which it had been collaborating to save 
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Republican Spain. At the same time the right in Mexico, whose ideology had much in 
common with the Catholic anti-communist doctrine ofNationalist Spain, was alienated from 
Berlin by the same treaty. As we have seen in the exchange between Francisco Cay6n y Cos 
and Pio Noriega, 158 Spanish support for Berlin was never that firm to begin with. As for 
Mexico, the linkage between Mexican domestic policy and international affairs that Beteta 
described, so recently established by Cardenista foreign policy, was inevitably broken. Even 
so,full Mexican subscription to the American project of hemispheric defense cannot be dated 
from the signing of the treaty between Ribbentrop and Molotov. After all, Mexican oil 
continued to be transported by the Japanese from ports along Mexico's Pacific coast to 
Vladivostok, thence on to Berlin. If nothing else, this trade arrangement reflects the triumph 
of money in Mexican politics. 
What I would argue is apparent is that the Falange was able to take advantage of both 
financial reforms adopted by Cardenas in the early period of his tenure and the post-
expropriation spike in Mexican-German commerce. Both of these policies assisted the 
Spanish colony in cementing their position within Mexico's fmancial institutions. It was the 
earlier reforms that started this process. Aside from La Comercial and La Provincial, linked 
to Banco de Comercio and Banco de Londres, respectively, this investigation has found links 
between the Franquistas ofthe Spanish colony to three insurance companies: Hornik's 
General Insurance Company, Ltd., of Trieste and Venezia, liligo Noriega's La Fraternidad, 
and Luis G. Burgos's La Aurora. Thus, by taldng protectionist measures intended to buttress 
Mexican insurance companies in 1935 Cardenas closed the front door to the more benign 
158 Supra voce, 4 7-48. 
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financial foreign interests and opened the back door to Spanish and latent Porftrian interests 
who were friendly to Franco and had embedded themselves within the banking sector. As 
Table One shows, many of these interests had been present in Mexico since the Porfirio Dlaz 
regime that predated the Revolution. Angel Urraza, Jose Marla Arechederra, Augusto Ibafiez 
Serrano, Gilberto Ruido Garcia, and others, had entered Mexico in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. The Noriega family had come earlier, gained prominence during the 
Porfrriato, and by the decade of the 1930s we find that Plo Noriega was a favorite 
correspondent of Cay6n y Cos. 
Some of these highly influential Franquistas were industrialists such as Urraza and 
the Arechederra brothers. Where their participation in either the UNE or the Falange is 
concerned, their first priority was Franco's victory in Spain. The main contribution 
Franquistas in Mexico were to make to Franco's war effort was financial support. This must 
have become even more important after the Civil War than beforehand. While the Spanish 
Civil War was ongoing Franco could get all the arms he wanted from Germany and Italy. 
However, once it became necessary to govern Franco would need money to rebuild a nation 
that had been wracked by three years of war. Hitler and Goring, who had charge ofthe Nazi 
Five-Year Plan, were not nation-builders. The same may be said of Mussolini, who by this 
time had occupied Albania and had set his sights on Greece. Even more to the point, a strong 
Spain would have weakened Mussolini's prestige in the region. If Franco was going to find 
the funding to rebuild Spain, that funding did not exist in Spain and would not be 
forthcoming from his erstwhile Axis allies. Mexico, though not a wealthy country, presented 
an opportunity for Franco to find at least some of this funding. As the IPS record clearly 
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indicates, the financial infrastructure for his support already existed in the form of the 
Spanish colony in Mexico. 
If the past as presented here constitutes any sort of prologue, the reader might 
consider two facts that indicate the depth and duration of these financial entities' ties to 
Spain: in 2004 Banco de Comercio, known by that time as Bancomer, was absorbed by the 
Spanish bank BBVA, headquartered in the Basque city ofBilbao. 159 The story of Banco de 
Londres is a bit more tenuous but, as with any property description, arrives at the same point 
of beginning. In 1970, Londres absorbed the Compafi!a General de Aceptaciones (the 
majority shareholder in Londres in 1940, according to Hamilton), 160 becoming Grupo 
Financiera Serfin. In 1992, Serfin's majority shareholder, Adrian Sada, had the bank's · 
headquarters moved to Monterrey. 161 In 2000, Grupo Serfin was acquired by the Spanish 
bank Banco Santander.162 
However, it is not the outcome that is the proof. This study has shown Franquista 
presence in Mexico at a very early date. Many were remnants of the Porfiriato. Nearly all 
159 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., "El Grupo Nacional," 2012. Retrieved 
10Aug2012 from 
http://www.bbva.com/TLBB/tlbb/jsp/esp/conozca/historia/grpinter/index.jsp. 
160 Supra voce, 54. 
161 "Mexican Banks Pull Out of a Dive,'' Business Week, 1Sep1996. Retrieved 
1 0Aug2012 from http:/ /www.businessweek.com/stories/1996-09-0 1/mexican-banks-pull-out-
of-a-dive. 
162 Denisse del Angel Clulvez L6pez & Jose Luis Felix Arce, Mexico, opcion para el 
inversionista extranjero, 2003 [tesis, Universidad de las Americas Puebla] 81. Retrieved 
10Aug2012 from 
http://catarina.udlap.mx/u _ dl_ a/tales/documentos!Icp/chavez _I_ dd/portada.html. Banco 
Santander, S.A., "Historia,'' 2012. Retrieved 10Aug2012 from 
http://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite?appiD=santander.wc.CFWCSancomQPOl&canal= 
CSCORP&cid=l278677205483&empr=CFWCSancomQPOl&leng=es_ES&pagename=CF 
WCSancomQPO 1/GSinformacion/CFQPO I_ GSinformacionDetalleMultimedia_PT12. 
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were from the north coast of Spain: Basques, Asturians, with an occasional Galician mixed 
in. Coming from this region, they were Carlists by birth and Falangistas by necessity. They 
had accrued social and financial connections that afforded them the ability to support Franco 
during the Spanish Civil War. The Falange in Mexico was established to assist Franco and 
the Spanish Army when they rose up against the govermnent. Its primary function was to 
raise funds for Franco and distribute propaganda in Mexico. Funding needs were met because 
of the commercial positions that had been attained mainly by the UNE, not the Falange. The 
Falange was critical to the distribution of propaganda and would be a valuable asset to 
Franco's SIM in the future. 
Although the course of international events would force the linkage of Mexican 
foreign policy to American foreign policy, preventing a rapid rapprochement with Franco's 
new government, the Spanish colony was at least able to preserve a fmancial base in Mexico 
for Franco. This financial base was politically engaged in discrediting Cardenista reforms. 
Careful analysis of relations between the Falange and the Abwehr in Latin America shows 
that theirs was a marriage of convenience. When American advisors in Mexico City assured 
their government in Washington that the 'fascists' were under control, that statement should 
be read as 'Germans and Japanese,' not 'the Falange and SIM.' Franco's assets were 
operating freely as they always had done. 
There is also a social aspect to the conclusions that can be drawn here. The linguistic 
and religious bonds between Mexico and Spain remained strong. In this I am in complete 
agreement with Pablo Yankelevich. However, I would take that conclusion one step further. 
Foreign direct investment, as an economic concept, is a myth with respect to Spain's 
participation in the Mexican economy, and probably that of all Latin America (excepting 
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Brazil). Spanish investment in Mexico does not penetrate from without, it emanates from 
within. The fact that the Falange could not only survive in Mexico, but flourish to the point 
of influencing the most critical aspects of Mexican domestic policy illustrates this point. 
Although Alan Knight characterizes human relations between Mexicans and Spaniards as 
inherently adversarial- employer-employee or retailer-customer, likening the former to the 
position of American employers in Mexico and the latter to Jewish or Syrian retailers in 
Egypt163 -there is a critical difference. Spaniards in Mexico spoke the same language and 
professed the same faith as Mexicans. In this, human relations between Spaniards and 
Mexicans were bound to be more humanistic. In terms of familial and religious concepts, the 
two cultures were identical. For a Mexican oil worker, the first communion of his daughter 
was of little interest to his American foreman, but on a Spanish-owned hacienda this was an 
event that could be shared by employer and employee. Due to a similarity oflanguage, 
culture, religion, and other factors- not the least of which are personal ties established 
during the Porfiriato - Spain is probably more important to post-revolutionary Mexican 
history, particularly by way of comparison to the Protestant United States or the atheist Nazi 
Germany and Soviet Union, than historians are willing to acknowledge. The United States 
and Germany had one mode of influencing Mexican policy: money. The Soviet Union was 
limited to ideology. Spain had a variety of tools at its disposal, most of which carried greater 
moral weight than mere Yankee dollars or Marxist theory. At the same time, it should not be 
forgotten that money was also in the Spanish tool kit. 
163 Knight, 66-67. 
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Another area where Spain lies outside the normal analysis of Mexican political 
history is in the chronological assessment that credits the 1940 election for the shift in 
direction to the right and into the arms of American commercial interests. One can see a shift 
in Mexican government policy before Manuel Avila Camacho took office with the 
breakdown in Cardenista foreign policy. The Spanish Civil War was an important chapter in 
Mexican history, not only because it represents a rare instance of Mexico asserting its 
influence on international affairs, nor because of the rescue of tens of thousands of refi.Jgees 
from Franquista Spain and Vichy France - of which Mexicans can and should be proud -but 
also because of what lies on the right side of the political equation. Angel Urraza held a 
significant portion of shares in Banco de Londres before the 1940 election and after. Banco 
de Comercio held the Ejidal Bank's debt before and after that same election. In terms of the 
Spanish colony in Mexico City, the 1940 election and even the Second World War are a 
distraction. 
Although Spanish influence over PAN (Partido Acci6n Nacional) and the Almazan 
candidacy is broadly acknowledged, much less, if anything, is known about Spanish 
influence over PRl (Partido Revolucionario Institucional). It was the latter that ruled Mexico 
for seventy years. Yet it was PRl, as personified by Lazaro Cardenas and his govermnent, 
that tolerated the activities outlined in this thesis. Thus far, the few reasons for such tolerance 
that historians have been able to provide seem superficial. The govermnent obviously knew 
that the Spanish colony represented a threat; otherwise there would not have been any 
investigation. The investigation revealed that there was seditious activity ongoing in Mexico. 
It is significant enough that Mexico was the second largest supplier of arms to Republican 
Spain. That fact takes on even greater significance given the poor state of the Mexican 
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economy at the time- at any time for that matter. Yet the IPS investigations were allowed to 
languish and the Spanish colony's activities were allowed to persist. Although the research 
underlying this thesis is insufficient in scope to provide clear evidence of conflicts of interest 
that would explain such permissiveness, the potential for conflict of interest is certainly 
there. Sometimes it is just as worthwhile to persist in an investigation for the purpose of 
ruling something out as for proving it true. This is one of those cases, not only for the case in 
point but also for the more basic reason that so little exists in the historiography regarding 
Spanish influence in Mexico in general. Moreover, this study has established that the Spanish 
colony had its roots in the Porfirian regime. This raises an even more significant question in 
the Mexican historiography: did the Mexican Revolution represent a clean break with the 
Porfiriato? That debate is still ongoing. 
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